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Supported Decision-Making: A Viable
Alternative to Guardianship?t
Nina A. Kohn,* Jeremy A. Blumenthal** & Amy T.
Campbell* * *
Abstract
The law has traditionally responded to cognitive disability by
authorizing surrogate decision-makers to make decisions on behalf of
disabled individuals.
However, supported decision-making, an
alternative paradigm for addressing cognitive disability, is rapidly
gaining political support. According to its proponents, supported
decision-making empowers individuals with cognitive challenges by
ensuring that they are the ultimate decision-maker but are provided
support from one or more others, giving them the assistance they need to
make decisions for themselves.
This article describes supported
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decision-making and its normative appeal. It then provides a descriptive
account of how supported decision-making works based on the empirical
literature on supported decision-making as well as that on shared
decision-making, a related model used in medical contexts. The article
shows how employing supported decision-making in lieu of
guardianship, or integrating it into the guardianship system, has the
potential to promote the self-determination of persons with intellectual
and cognitive disabilities consistent with international and national legal
norms. However, we find that, despite much rhetoric touting its
advantages, little is known about how supported decision-making
processes operate or about the outcomes of those processes. Further
research is necessary to design and develop effective supported decisionmaking systems. We therefore propose a series of research questions to
help inform policy choices surrounding supported decision-making.
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INTRODUCTION

While all people can struggle to reach satisfying decisions, persons
with intellectual and cognitive disabilities face additional and often
profound challenges when doing so. The U.S. legal system has
historically responded to these challenges by creating mechanisms that
authorize others to make decisions for persons with intellectual and
cognitive disabilities. The most powerful and important of these
surrogate decision-making mechanisms is a guardianship proceeding, in
which a court appoints a third party to make decisions for a person with a
disability.
The use of surrogate decision-making and guardianship, however, is
coming under increasing criticism from disability rights advocates and
scholars who urge replacing it-or at least supplementing it-with a
process called "supported decision-making." Proponents of supported
decision-making tout it as a means to empower persons with disabilities
by providing them with help in making their own decisions, rather than
simply providing someone to make decisions for them.
Their
impassioned call to replace surrogate decision-making (sometimes
referred to as "substitute decision-making") with supported decisionmaking is rapidly gaining political momentum. This momentum is
attributable in part to the adoption of the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which includes language
that embraces supported decision-making and which is seen by some as
requiring nations to adopt supported decision-making mechanisms.
Despite the growing interest in supported decision-making, this
article represents the first systematic attempt to evaluate the claims and
arguments made by its promoters. Whereas previous writing on the topic
has focused almost exclusively on the normative arguments in favor of
supported decision-making, we seek to inform the supported decisionmaking debate by determining how its processes actually operate in
practice. To do so, we not only analyze the limited empirical literature
on supported decision-making but also draw insight from the literature
on "shared decision-making," a related approach that has been promoted
in medical settings. Our review of this literature allows us to identify
what policymakers need to know about supported decision-making in
order to determine whether it should be incorporated into surrogate
decision-making processes, used in lieu of surrogate decision-making
processes, or rejected altogether.
We conclude that, although supported decision-making presents an
appealing alternative to guardianship and therefore policymakers in the
United States should give serious consideration as to how it might be
incorporated into public policy, there is currently insufficient empirical
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evidence to know the extent to which (or the conditions under which) it
can remedy the problems posed by surrogate decision-making processes.
Specifically, we find that, despite years of use, there is almost no
evidence as to how decisions are actually made in supported decisionmaking relationships; the effect of such relationships on persons in need
of decision-making assistance; or the quality of the decisions that result.
Without more information, it is impossible to know whether supported
decision-making actually empowers persons with cognitive and
intellectual disabilities. Furthermore, there is reason to be concerned that
supported decision-making might actually have the opposite effect,
disempowering such individuals or making them more vulnerable to
manipulation, coercion, or abuse. Therefore, in addition to making
policy recommendations, we suggest a series of research questions
designed to increase the likelihood that policymakers will have the
information they need to evaluate supported decision-making and the
claims of its proponents.
This article proceeds in four major Parts. Part II explores criticisms
of the U.S. legal system's current approach to addressing decisionmaking challenges faced by persons with cognitive and intellectual
disabilities, the ways in which implementation of supported decisionmaking could fundamentally alter that approach, and the normative
arguments in favor of such a shift. Part III explores the empirical
literature on supported decision-making and not only discusses what that
literature shows but also identifies the important questions this literature
fails to answer.' Part IV then suggests how research on shared decisionmaking (a related decision-making paradigm) might inform policy and
research on supported decision-making. Finally, Part V makes a series
of recommendations for policy and future research.
II.

THE CALL FOR SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING

Individuals with intellectual disabilities (ID) or other forms of
cognitive disability can face significant decision-making challenges.
Some of these challenges are the result of their underlying disabilities,
which make analytical and other cognitive tasks more difficult for them.
Other challenges are the result of their social environment. For example,
stereotypical thinking about persons with ID may result in their being

1. A condensed review of the findings from the empirical literature on supported
decision-making can be found in Nina A. Kohn & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Critical
Assessment of Supported Decision-Making for Persons with Intellectual Disabilities,
DISABILITY & HEALTH J. (forthcoming 2013), published in conjunction with the May
2012 conference noted above.
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denied the opportunity to develop and practice decision-making skills.
These decision-making challenges typically increase and evolve as such
individuals grow older. For example, the primary source of decisionmaking assistance for persons with ID is typically their parents. 3
Existing decision-making systems can become destabilized and may
even disappear as these parents themselves age and increasingly
predecease their children. As a result, persons with ID may be
confronted with the need to establish new systems for obtaining the help
they need in making everyday decisions. In addition, such transitions
may precipitate the need to make momentous life decisions,4 such as the
decision of where to live after the death of a parent with whom the
person with ID resided.5
In this Part, we describe the legal system's current approach to
addressing the decision-making challenges faced by such individuals and
the growing critique of that approach. We then explore how such
challenges might be addressed under an alternative, supported decisionmaking paradigm in which a person with the disability is the ultimate
decision-maker but receives support from other people as well.
Specifically, we provide an overview of supported decision-making, the
arguments in favor of its use, and the potential advantages it might afford
persons with cognitive and intellectual disabilities.

A.

The CurrentApproach: SurrogateDecision-Making

The U.S. legal system's primary response to the decision-making
challenges faced by persons with cognitive and intellectual disabilities is
to provide for the appointment of surrogate (or "substitute") decision-

2. See Barbara L. Ludlow, Life After Loss: Legal Ethical and PracticalIssues, in
AGING,

RIGHTS

AND

QUALITY

OF

LIFE:

PROSPECTS

FOR

OLDER

PEOPLE

WITH

189, 197 (Stanley S. Herr & Germain Weber eds., 1999)
(suggesting that decision-making is a skill that can be learned); ROBERT M. LEVY &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES

LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES

106 (1996)

(noting that many persons with ID "are frequently not allowed to participate in decision
making to the extent of their abilities").
3.

See CHRISTINE

BIGBY, AGEING WITH A LIFELONG DISABILITY

193 (2004).

4. Both types of challenges are exacerbated by the fact that many families do not
adequately plan for these transitions. See Tamar Heller & John Kramer, Involvement of
Adult Siblings ofPersons with Developmental Disabilitiesin Future Planning,47 INTELL.

& DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 208, 208 (2009) (citing research indicating that only
between 25% and 50% of families of adults with developmental disabilities have made
plans for future living arrangements); BIGBY, supra note 3, at 204 ("Most studies show
that only between one-third and one-half of parents make concrete plans for the future of
an adult with intellectual disability who is living at home.").
5. Cf BIGBY, supra note 3, at 161 (stating that most adults with intellectual
disabilities live with their parents "well into middle age" and showing how parental aging
and death precipitate difficult decisions about housing).
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makers for them. Typically, the appointment is made through a
guardianship proceeding, a court proceeding in which a judge appoints a
third party (called a "guardian") to make some or all decisions on behalf
of an incapacitated individual (called a "ward"). 6 Indeed, many states
effectively encourage guardianship over persons with ID by creating
special, streamlined processes for obtaining guardianship over persons
with ID or developmental disabilities that are not available for persons
with other disabilities.7 These specialized processes can reduce the
barriers to obtaining guardianship and can also encourage the use of
plenary guardianships-those that cover all types of decisions, as
opposed to decisions about select issues, such as finances.8
Although guardianship is the most comprehensive method for
legally empowering surrogate decision-makers, other surrogate decisionmaking mechanisms also exist. Some states have created processes by
which third parties can make surrogate decisions for persons with ID
without specific court authorization. For example, New York State
empowers panels of four volunteers (which by law must include both a
health care professional and an attorney) to make major medical
treatment decisions in state-operated or state-licensed facilities. 9 The
Social Security Administration can appoint a third party (called a
''representative payee") to manage an individual's public benefits

6. As state law governs the guardianship process, its procedural requirements vary
somewhat from state to state. Key differences include how states define "incapacity" for
the purposes of imposing a guardianship, how states select a guardian for a ward, the
extent and nature of state supervision over the guardian once appointed, and the extent
and nature of due process protections provided to would-be wards. Guardianship
proceedings are initiated by an interested party who files a petition with the appropriate
court, alleging that an individual cannot make all or some decisions on his own behalf
and that, therefore, the state should appoint a guardian to make decisions for him. This
triggers a court fact-finding process to determine whether a guardianship should be
imposed and, if so, who should serve as guardian. As the result of such a proceeding, a
court can deny the petition, grant a plenary guardianship, or grant a limited guardianship.
In a plenary guardianship, the ward is completely stripped of his or her legal decisionmaking capacity; in a limited guardianship, by contrast, the ward retains certain forms of
decision-making power. Some states also differentiate between guardianship over the
person (in which the guardian is granted the right to make personal and health care
decisions for the ward) and conservatorship (in which the guardian is granted the right to
make financial decisions for a ward). Increasingly, however, the term "guardianship" is
used to refer to both situations. See NINA A. KoHN, ELDER LAW: CASES, PROBLEMS,
EXERCISES (forthcoming 2013).
7. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-13-21 (2012); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1750
(2012).
8. For one court's thoughtful and disconcerting explanation of the issue, see In re
Chaim A.K., 885 N.Y.S.2d 582 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2009) (discussing the difference between
the Article 17-A guardianship and Article 81 guardianship in New York).
9. See NY MENTAL HYG. L. art. 80 (McKinney's 2013); see also LEVY &
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 107.
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without triggering a court process. In addition, despite misconceptions to
the contrary, many persons with cognitive and intellectual disabilities can
themselves appoint surrogate decision-makers by executing powers of
attorney or advance directives for health care. l°
Even so, in recent years, disability rights scholars and advocates,
both in the United States and internationally, have challenged the
appropriateness and acceptability of guardianship for persons with
disabilities, especially those with ID. One concern is that guardianship
law is frequently misapplied, with significant consequences for
individuals' basic civil rights and civil liberties.11 The guardianship
system is designed as a last resort, applied only when an individual lacks
capacity to make decisions. However, there is reason to believe that
guardianships are imposed on many individuals without sufficient
evidence of their decision-making incapacity12 and that, in some cases,
disability alone appears to be used as a sufficient justification for the
imposition of guardianship. 13 Thus, rather than being treated as the
extraordinary proceedings that they are, guardianships are often treated

10. See GARY L. STEIN, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADVANCE
DIRECTIVES AND ADVANCE CARE PLANNING FOR PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL AND

PHYSICAL DISABILITIES (2007), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/2007/
adacp.htm (discussing the ability of persons with ID to engage in advance care
directives); Marshall Kapp, Health Care DecisionMaking, in AGING, RIGHTS AND
QUALITY OF LIFE, supra note 2, at 45, 53 (stating that "many older adults with mental
retardation are capable and, with adequate and timely counseling, desirous of executing a
proxy directive when a close family member or friend is available to serve in the
surrogate role," and noting that less capacity may be needed to appoint a surrogate
decision-maker than to make the ultimate health care decision the surrogate is appointed
to make).
11. See, e.g., Guardianship,THE ARC (Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.thearc.org/page.
aspx?pid=2351 ("Guardianship has been over-used by those who were unaware of less
intrusive alternatives or who simply wanted to have their views prevail over the wishes of
Frequently, lesser forms of legal intervention, such as limited
the individual.
guardianship and use of powers of attorney or advance directives, have been either
overlooked, intentionally avoided, or unavailable.").
12. See PAMELA B. TEASTER ET AL., WARDS OF THE STATE: A NATIONAL STUDY OF
PUBLIC GUARDIANSHIP 15-16 (2005) (discussing research and evidence on the misuse of
guardianship, including a 1994 national study by the Center for Social Gerontology
finding that the majority of guardianship hearings last less than 15 minutes); Lawrence A.
Frolik, GuardianshipReform: When the Best is the Enemy of the Good, 9 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 347, 354 (1998) (noting that, "as long as the law permits plenary
guardianship, courts will prefer to use it[,]" even though plenary guardianship is only
appropriate in a sub-set of cases, and urging those promoting guardianship reform to
prioritize educating judges about limited guardianship).
13. See Dorothy Squatrito Millar, Age of Majority, Transfer of Rights and
Guardianship: Considerationfor Families and Educators, 38 EDUC. & TRAINING IN
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 378, 390 (2003) (noting that "disability alone does not
equate with incapacity resulting in a need for guardianship," despite a tendency to treat it
as such).
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14
as a routine part of permanency planning for persons with ID.
Significant reforms have been implemented to reduce the overbreadth of
guardianship orders by encouraging the use of limited guardianships in
lieu of plenary ones; nevertheless, these reforms have had remarkably
little effect on judicial behavior. 15 The result is that guardianshipsincluding plenary guardianships-appear to be routinely granted over
persons with ID.
The excessive use of guardianship and, in particular, the use of
excessively broad guardianship orders is a problem that is not limited to
wards with ID. 16 However, the over-imposition of guardianship may be
an especially acute problem for persons with ID because guardianship
proceedings are frequently treated as a central part of permanency
planning for adults with ID.' 7 Moreover, caregivers of persons with ID
may be pushed to apply for guardianship in order to access or manage
benefits. For example, provisions in the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) encourage parents to obtain guardianship over
their children with ID in order to continue to manage their children's
8
public education benefits after they reach the age of majority. 1
Another criticism is that the guardianship system in its current form
is unlawful even if properly applied. Specifically, some critics have
assailed the concept of guardianship as inconsistent with Article 12 of
the CRPD.' 9 Article 12 states that "persons with disabilities enjoy legal

14. See Ludlow, supranote 2, at 198 ("Assignment of a guardianship to parents is all
too often a rite of passage for people with developmental disabilities as they enter
adulthood."); BIGBY, supra note 3, at 203-04 (2004) (describing guardianship as part of
the standard practice of planning for the future of persons with ID).
15. See Frolik, supra note 12, at 349, 354 (explaining that limited guardianships are
rarely ordered, even when legally appropriate); Pamela B. Teaster et al., Wards of the
State: A National Study of Public Guardianship,37 STETSON L. REV. 193, 233 (2007)
(reporting, based on a national study, that "[c]ourts rarely appoint the public guardian as a
limited guardian").
16. Jennifer Moye et al., Clinical Evidence in Guardianship of Older Adults Is
Inadequate: Findingsfrom a Tri-State Study, 47 GERONTOLOGIST 604 (2007) (in a study
of guardianships of people age 55 and older, discussing the larger problem of inadequate
clinical bases for guardianship).
17. See sources cited supranote 14 and accompanying text.
18. Millar, supra note 13, at 390 (noting that the IDEA states that students are to be
decision-makers once they reach the age of majority unless they are considered to be
incompetent).
19. See Michael L. Perlin, "Strikingfor the Guardiansand Protectorsof the Mind":
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Future of
GuardianshipLaw, 117 PENN STATE L. REV. 1159, 1177 (2013) ("The Convention forces
us to abandon substituted decisionmaking paradigms and to replace them with supported
decisionmaking ones."); TINA MINKOWITZ, SUBMISSION TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE
RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, DAY OF GENERAL DISCUSSION ON CRPD ARTICLE
12 (2010) (declaring guardianship and all other forms of substituted decision-making to
be contrary to the CRPD); cf Robert D. Dinerstein, Implementing Legal Capacity Under
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capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life."2 ° Some
have interpreted this Article as inconsistent with state removal of legal
capacity through the guardianship system, 21 or at least with plenary
guardianship. 22 Arguably, overuse of guardianships also constitutes
disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities
provided with reasonable, less
Act (ADA) insofar as individuals are not
23
restrictive alternatives to guardianship.
24
A third concern is that guardianship is anti-therapeutic.
Guardianship need not mean that wards are not involved in making
decisions about their lives. 25 Current systems, however, do not promote
27
such involvement 26 and may leave wards feeling isolated and lonely.

Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Personswith Disabilities:The Difficult
Road from Guardianshipto Supported Decision-Making, 19 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 8 (2012)
(discussing different countries' responses to Article 12 in relation to guardianship).
20. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) art. 12, G.A. Res.
61/106, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006). Notably, this is a departure from the
approach of the 1971 Declaration of the Rights of Mentally Handicapped, which stated
that "the mentally retarded person has a right to a qualified guardian when this is required
to protect his personal well-being and interests." ANDREAS DIMOPOULOS, ISSUES IN
HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED PERSONS 69 (2010).
21. See Amita Dhanda, Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention:
Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestarfor the Future?, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM.
429, 460-62 (2007) (arguing that, while the language of Article 12 does not prohibit
substituted decision-making, reading Article 12 in light of the process that led to its
creation supports interpreting it as doing so).
22. See Barbara Carter, Adult Guardianship:Human Rights or Social Justice?, 18
J.L. & MED. 143 (2010), available at http://www.publicadvocate.vic.gov.au/file/file/
Research/AdultGuardianship.pdf (describing the active debate over whether Article 12
permits guardianship). But see Dhanda, supra note 21, at 460-61 (arguing that the CRPD
should be read as promoting the recognition that persons with disabilities have full legal
capacity but acknowledging that "[t]he text of Article 12 does not prohibit substituted
decision-making and there is language which could even be used to justify substitution").
23. See Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again): Substituted Decision
Making as a Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title H of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REv. 157 (2010) [hereinafter Salzman, Rethinking
Guardianship](arguing that the United States' current approach to guardianship violates
the ADA's mandate that services be provided in the most integrated and least restrictive
manner).
24. See, e.g., Jennifer Wright, Guardianshipfor Your Own Good: Improving the
Well-Being of Respondents and Wards in the USA, 33 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 350
(2010) (discussing a variety of ways in which guardianship can be anti-therapeutic).
25. Pamela Teaster, The Wards of Public Guardians: Voices of the Unbefriended, 51
FAM. RELATIONS 344, 348 (2002) (in a qualitative study interviewing 13 wards of public
guardians, finding that four contributed to decisions about daily activities).
26. Id. (in a qualitative study interviewing 13 wards of public guardians, finding that
there was an absence of documentation in wards' case files about wards' "needs and
wishes, such as a values history").
27. Id. (in a qualitative study interviewing 13 wards of public guardians, finding
such sentiments common); Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship, supra note 23, at 163
(describing guardianship as creating "constructive isolation").
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Guardianship may also undermine wards' physical and psychological
well-being by reducing their sense of control over their own lives.28
Ironically, such anti-therapeutic effects may be the cost of obtaining
needed, or at least beneficial, services and support. For example, The
Arc, a leading advocacy and service organization for persons with
intellectual and development disabilities, explains that caregivers may
feel forced into obtaining guardianship over a person with 29ID in order to
help the individual access medical care and other supports.
Finally, there is a moral critique of surrogate decision-making, and
especially guardianship, as an affront to the humanity of those subject to
it. For example, Canadian disability rights advocate Michael Bach has
declared guardianship to be "[s]tate-sanctioned removal of personhood
from an individual with respect to one or more or all areas of personal
decision-making."3 ° Others have characterized imposition of
guardianship as a form of "civil death."'"
B.

The ParadigmShift: SupportedDecision-Making

In light of these serious concerns, critics, of guardianship and
surrogate decision-making have suggested replacing that approach with
"supported decision-making." As a general matter, supported decisionmaking occurs when an individual with cognitive challenges is the
ultimate decision-maker but is provided support from one or more
persons who explain issues to the individual and, where necessary,
interpret the individual's words and behavior to determine his or her
preferences." However, some advocates do not use the term "supported
decision-making" this broadly. Instead, they reserve the term for
situations in which the person being supported has voluntarily entered
into the arrangement, and these advocates use terms like facilitated
decision-making and co-decision-making to describe other versions of

28. See Wright, supra note 24, at 355-56 (arguing that guardianship may harm
individuals by reducing their sense of control).
29. See THE ARC, supra note 11.
30. Michael Bach, PowerPoint, Legal Capacity, Personhood and Supported
Decision Making, Can. Ass'n for Cmty Living (U.N. Enable Working Group, Jan. 2006),
availableat http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc7docs/ahc7ii3.ppt.
31. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 19, at 1162 (endorsing this view, at least with regard
to the use of guardianship in certain jurisdictions).
32. See UNITED NATIONS ENABLE, HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS ON THE
CONVENTION OF RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES ch. 6 (2007), available at
http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.aspid=212
(providing a parallel but longer
definition); MICHAEL BACH & LANA KERZNER, A NEW PARADIGM FOR PROTECTING
AUTONOMY AND THE RIGHT TO LEGAL CAPACITY (2010), available at http://www.lcocdo.org/disabilities/bach-kerzner.pdf
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supported decision-making.33
Further confusing the definition of
supported decision-making is the fact that many of the statutory schemes
widely described as enabling supported decision-making have features
that are inconsistent with how its promoters typically define supported
decision-making. For example, as noted below, there is a tendency to
describe supported decision-making as providing the principal with full
control over what decisions are made, even when the underlying law
provides exceptions to this approach.34
1.

Models of Supported Decision-Making

There is no single model of supported decision-making.3 5
Supported decision-making can be purely informal-something done
without legal sanction or legal enforceability. Alternatively, it can be
formalized through a private but legally enforceable or legally significant
agreement between the person with a disability and a trusted third party.
Such formalized supported decision-making relationships, in turn, may
be pre-existing relationships to which the state gives legal recognition,3 6
or they may be new relationships created for the purpose of providing
state-sanctioned support.
Perhaps the most frequently cited model of supported decisionmaking is British Columbia's Representation Agreement.
British
Columbia is one of several Canadian provinces that have statutorily
enabled private contracts as alternatives to guardianship. 37 In British
Columbia, an adult may enter into a Representation Agreement that
33. For a discussion of these different definitions, see LANA KERZNER, PAVING THE
WAY TO FULL REALIZATION OF THE CRPD's RIGHTS TO LEGAL CAPACITY AND SUPPORTED
DECISION-MAKING:
A
CANADIAN
PERSPECTIVE
(2011),
available
at
http://www.anth.ubc.ca/fileadmin/userupload/CIC/documents/InFromThe MarginsP
aper-LanaKerzner-FINAL-April_22_2011
2_.pdf; BACH & KERZNER, supra note 32.
34. See, e.g., BACH & KERZNER, supra note 32, at 90 (recognizing the reasonableness
limitation in the British Columbia model but then stating that the supporter in that system
is always bound by the wishes and instructions of the principal). In addition, while most
definitions of supported decision-making do not include (and indeed, often explicitly
exclude) the use of advance planning tools by which a person appoints a surrogate
decision-maker (e.g., health care proxies and durable powers of attorney), even this is not
uniformly the case. See Soumitra Pathare & Laura S. Shields, Supported DecisionMaking for Persons with Mental Illness: A Review, 34 PUB. HEALTH REVS. 1, 4 (2012)
(describing such advance planning tools as a form of supported decision-making).
35. See Leslie Salzman, Guardianshipfor Persons with Mental Illness-A Legal &
Appropriate Alternative?, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 279, 306 (2011)
[hereinafter Salzman, Guardianshipfor Persons].
36. See Terry Carney, Participation and Services Access Rights for People with
IntellectualDisability:A Role for Law?, 38 J. INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY 59,
60 (2013) (noting that supported decision-making is frequently described as simply
recognizing existing social structures).
37. See BACH & KERZNER, supra note 32, at 53.
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authorizes a third party to act on his or her behalf for a broad range of
personal decisions as well as many, but not all, financial decisions. The
person creating the Agreement retains his or her full legal capacity, can
revoke the Agreement at any time, and must be consulted by the
representative. 38 There is only a minimal capacity requirement' 39 to enter
into a standard Representation Agreement (i.e., one that does not
delegate certain powers, such as the ability to make decisions about
placement in a nursing home or refusal of life-sustaining treatment),4 °
and there is a presumption that all people are capable of entering into one
absent a showing to the contrary. 41 Consequently, a person who would
not have sufficient capacity to execute an enduring power of attorney or
other form of contract may enter into a standard Agreement.42
Ordinarily, under the British Columbia approach, a representative
acting according to a Representation Agreement must, consistent with
common conceptions of supported decision-making, consult with the
principal and comply with his or her wishes.43 Even so, the model
actually empowers a representative to act in a way inconsistent with full
self-determination for the principal: statutorily, the representative need
only consult with the principal "to the extent reasonable" 44 and need only
comply with the principal's wishes "if reasonable to do so."'45 This is
one example of ways in which the description of these models by those
calling for supported decision-making is somewhat inconsistent with the
underlying statutes governing these models.46

38. In British Columbia, the charity Nidus Personal Planning Resource Centre helps
individuals form Representation Agreements, and its website is a valuable explanatory
resource. See RepresentationAgreement, NIDUs, http://www.nidus.ca/?page id=50/ (last
visited Mar. 22, 2013).
39. See Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, ch. 405, pt. 2.8 (Can.)
(providing that an adult may enter into a standard Representation Agreement despite
being "incapable of (a) making a contract, (b) managing his or her health care, personal
care or legal matters, or (c) the routine management of his or her financial affairs").
40. See id. pt. 2.4 (simply stating that "[a]n adult may make a representation
agreement unless he or she is incapable of doing so" but not defining what it means to be
incapable of doing so).
41. See id. pt. 1.3 ("Until the contrary is demonstrated, every adult is presumed to be
capable of (a) making, changing or revoking a representation agreement, and (b) making
decisions about personal care, health care and legal matters and about the routine
management of the adult's financial affairs.").
42. See id. pt. 2.8 (setting forth the test of incapability for standard agreements).
43. See id pt. 3.16 (setting forth the duties of the representative).
44. Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, ch. 405, pt. 3.16 (Can.).
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., BACH & KERZNER, supranote 32, at 90 (recognizing the reasonableness
limitation in the British Columbia model but then stating that the supporter in that system
is always bound by the wishes and instructions of the principal).
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Although supported decision-making is typically presented as
involving a single decision-making supporter, private supported
decision-making relationships may also occur in the context of a "circle
of support" or a "microboard." A circle of support is a group of people,
typically family members and friends, who meet regularly with a person
with a disability to help that person formulate and realize his or her
hopes or desires. Circles of support are seen as a way of creating or reinvigorating a support network for a person with a disability, 47 which
may be especially important for persons with lID experiencing
generational transitions in their support network. A microboard is
similar to a circle of support in that it is also comprised of a group of
people who aim to help an individual meet his or her needs in a manner
consistent with his or her hopes and desires. However, the term
"microboard" is typically used to refer to organizations that are more
formal: non-profit organizations formed to support and, in some cases,
to act as the service provider for an individual with a disability. 48 To the
extent that a circle of support helps a person understand various life
choices and choose among them, or that a microboard is structured to
allow the person with a disability to direct its actions (e.g., such as by
having that individual serve as the President of the Board), 49 both
approaches can be mechanisms for implementing supported decisionmaking. By contrast, if the members of a micro-board or circle of
support ultimately make decisions on behalf of the person with a
disability--even if they consult with that person and consider the
person's wishes-then such arrangements should not be classified as
supported decision-making.
Alternatively, supported decision-making can be accomplished
through public appointment. 50 For example, Sweden provides for the

47.

See, e.g., Allison Rowlands, Ability or Disability?: Strengths-basedPractice in

the Area of Traumatic Brain Injury, 82 FAMILIES INSoc. 273, 274 (2001) (describing
circles of support as "a contrived, purpose-built friendship network, established and
facilitated by a worker or trained volunteer, to replace or re-invigorate the natural
network of a person whose disability may have led to former friends dropping
away...").
48. For a discussion of the work and impact of three successful microboards, see
Paul H. Malette, Lifestyle Quality and Person-CenteredSupport: Jeff, Janet, Stephanie,
and the MicroboardProject, in PERSON-CENTERED PLANNING 151 (Steve Holburn &
Peter M. Vietze eds., Paul Brooks Publishing 2002).
49. For descriptions of microboards and their structures, see JACKIE L. GOLDEN,
INCLUSION RESEARCH INST., SELF-DIRECTED SUPPORT CORPORATIONS (n.d.), available at
http://www.reinventingquality.org/docs/golden.pdf; Kristi Dezonia, Microboards: An
Option in Life Span Supports, 39 THE EXCEPTIONAL PARENT 56 (2009).
50. See Salzman, Guardianshipfor Persons, supra note 35, at 307-09 (dividing
supported decision-making approaches into two major groups: private agreement
approaches and court-appointed approaches).
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appointment of a god man, which translates roughly as "good man" or
"mentor," who can provide many of the services that a guardian would
provide in the United States. Appointment of a god man does not affect
the legal capacity of the recipient. The god man concept contains a
central paradox: the god man is said to act with the consent of the person
with cognitive challenges and to be limited in his or her ability to act
without that consent; however, the god man can be appointed without
consent and for an individual who lacks capacity to provide consent.51
The Canadian province of Saskatchewan takes an approach similar to
that of Sweden, but one that works through the court system instead of
through municipal government.5 2 Specifically, Saskatchewan authorizes
its courts to appoint a co-decision-maker for personal and/or property
decisions for people whose cognitive capacity is impaired to the extent
that they require assistance. 53 Unlike a guardian, the co-decision-maker
must "acquiesce in any decision made by the adult provided that a
reasonable person could have made that decision and the decision is not
likely to result in a loss to the adult's estate., 54 Co-decision-makers are
of the person they
also explicitly required to maximize the participation
55
assisting.
are
they
which
with
decisions
in
assist
2.

Proposals for Integrating Supported Decision-Making into
U.S. Legal Systems

Just as there are a variety of supported decision-making models, the
call to formalize supported decision-making takes several forms. First,
there have been proposals to integrate supported decision-making into
existing guardianship structures. The 2011 National Guardianship
Network convened the Third National Guardianship Summit, an
interdisciplinary consensus conference that brought together experts
from across the United States. The Summit released a series of
recommendations for guardianship reform that implicitly called for the
incorporation of supported decision-making components into the existing

51.

Stanley

S.

Herr,

Self-Determination, Autonomy,

and Alternatives for

Guardianship, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES:

DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL 429, 433 (Stanley S. Herr et al. eds., 2003).
52. See Doug Surtees, The Evolution of Co-Decision-Making in Saskatchewan, 73

SASK. L. REV. 75 (2010) (describing Saskatchewan's system).
53. See BACH & KERZNER, supra note 32, at 55 (distinguishing co-decision making
from supported decision making on the grounds that the subject does not voluntarily enter
into the arrangement); Surtees, supra note 52 (describing when appointment of a codecision maker is authorized under Saskatchewan law).
54. Surtees, supra note 52, at 85.
55. See id.
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guardianship system.56 Many of the recommendations took the form of
recommended "standards," calling for the ward to be involved in
decision-making about his or her life. The recommendations included an
overall call for guardians to engage in "person-centered planning,"
defined by the Summit as an approach that seeks to "discover,
understand, and clearly describe the unique characteristics of an
individual," with the aim of ensuring that an individual is supported in a
"web of relationships," is valued for his or her contributions to the
community, and has control over his or her own life. 7 Supportive
elements were also incorporated into a number of more specific
standards. For example, in the context of residential decisions, the
Summit recommended that guardians "do everything possible to help the
person express his or her goals, needs or preferences" if he or she has
difficulty doing so. 5 8 In the context of financial decision-making, the
Summit recommended that wards be "encourage[d] ...to act on [their]

own behalf and to participate in decisions, 59 and be assisted in
developing or regaining capacity to make decisions.6 ° Second, some
have called for establishing supported decision-making structures as an
alternative to guardianship, thereby diverting some or most would-be
wards into an alternative model. 61 This approach is consistent with the
concept of guardianship as a last resort. As Salzman has observed,

56. Cf Kristin Booth Glen, Changing Paradigms:Mental Capacity,Legal Capacity,
Guardianship & Beyond, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93 (2012) (describing how
supported decision-making principles came to be incorporated into the Summit's
recommendations).
57. Symposium, Third National Guardianship Summit Standards and
Recommendations, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1191, 1192 (2012).
58. Id. at 1197.
The guardian shall identify and advocate for the person's goals, needs, and
preference. Goals are what are important to the person about where he or she
lives, whereas preferences are specific expressions of choice. First, the
guardian shall ask the person what he or she wants. Second, if the person has
difficulty expressing what he or she wants, the guardian shall do everything
possible to help the person express his or her goals, needs, and preferences.
Third, only when the person, even with assistance, cannot express his or her
goals and preferences, the guardian shall seek input from others familiar with
the person to determine what the individual would have wanted. Finally, only
when the person's goals and preferences cannot be ascertained, the guardian
shall make a decision in the person's best interest. Id.
59. Id.at 1194.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Salzman, Guardianshipfor Persons,supra note 35 (arguing that states
should embrace supported decision-making as an alternative to guardianship and that
doing so may be required by the Americans with Disabilities Act); Glen, supra note 56
(arguing that guardianship should be reserved for only the most extreme cases of
incapacity, and showing why fewer cases may satisfy this criterion than commonly
thought).
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guardianship cannot truly be a last resort unless there are meaningful
alternatives to it.62 Notably, there is overlap between these two
approaches in that a jurisdiction could both create supported decisionmaking alternatives to guardianship and incorporate supported decisionmaking elements into guardianship proceedings.63
Finally, some advocates and scholars have recommended that the
court-based guardianship system be abolished in favor of supported
decision-making mechanisms, while others have called for abolishing
plenary guardianship in favor of supported decision-making but would
accept retaining limited guardianship.64 Either approach would be a
departure from the current practice in countries seen as models for
supported decision-making, as all retain guardianship as a safety net.6 5
3.

The Appeal of Supported Decision-Making

Despite this variation in types of calls for supported decisionmaking, they all share a common recognition that persons with cognitive
and intellectual disabilities typically require more support to make
decisions than persons without such disabilities, and embrace a role for
62.

Salzman, Guardianshipfor Persons,supra note 35, at 312.

63.

See

OFFICE

OF

THE

PUB.

ADVOCATE,

SUPPORTED

DECISION-MAKING:

(stating that "[m]any of the principles of
supported decision-making can be incorporated into guardianship legislation[,]" but also
suggesting the adoption of supported decision-making alternatives to guardianship).
BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION PAPER 17 (2009)

64. See, e.g., EUR. COMM'R H.R., ISSUE PAPER, WHO GETS TO DECIDE? RIGHT TO
LEGAL CAPACITY FOR PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL AND PSYCHOSOCIAL DISABILITIES

(2012), available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1908555 (advocating for
abolishment of plenary guardianship); Nandini Devi et al., Moving Towards Substituted
or Supported Decision-Making?Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, 5 EUR. J. DISABILITY RES. 249 (2011); DiMOPOULOS, supra note 20, at
46-47 (calling the "basic form of guardianship" unsatisfactory and stating that it must be
"replaced by a legal framework of both protection and support, which will be offered
non-coercively and tailored to meet the needs of each person with intellectual
disability"); MENTAL DISABILITY ADVOCACY CTR. & ASS'N OF Soc. AFFIRMATION OF
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES, OUT OF SIGHT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN PSYCHIATRIC
HOSPITALS AND SOCIAL CARE INSTITUTIONS IN CROATIA 12, 14, 57 (2011), available at

http://www.mdac.info/sites/mdac.info/files/croatiareport201 len.pdf (recommending that
guardianship be abolished in Croatia, but then apparently limiting this recommendation to
the abolishment of plenary guardianship); Dhanda, supra note 21, at 460-62 (arguing that
guardianship is a result of prejudice and is inconsistent with Article 12 of the CRPD);
Bach, supranote 30.
65. Salzman, Guardianshipfor Persons,supra note 35, at 311. For example, while
Sweden does not have a system called "guardianship," its "administrator" system is
effectively a guardianship system. Indeed, Herr describes the administrator system as

essentially identical to guardianship except that the subject retains capacity to vote. See
Herr, supra note 51. Yet, in a number of U.S. states, wards retain their right to vote. See
Sally Balch Hurme & Paul S. Appelbaum, Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote: The
Effect of Mental Impairment on the Rights of Voters, 38 McGEORGE L. REV. 931, 950-57
(2007).
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the state in providing or facilitating that support. This recognition is
consistent with current understandings of the challenges faced by persons
with such disabilities. While individuals with cognitive and intellectual
disabilities tend to have preferences as to their daily living arrangements,
they may need extensive support to understand the options they have
relative to those preferences and to understand how to effectuate their
wishes. 66 For example, a study of adults with learning disabilities being
cared for by elderly caregivers found that it was difficult for some
participants to consider and talk about housing arrangements if their
parents died or became too ill. 67 In part, the need for additional support
reflects such individuals' underlying disability. It also, however, may
reflect the fact that individuals with ID often have little experience
making important life decisions 68for themselves because they have been
given few opportunities to do so.
The concept of supported decision-making is therefore appealing
from multiple perspectives. From a civil rights perspective, it recognizes
the personhood of persons with cognitive and intellectual disabilities and
avoids stripping them of their fundamental freedoms. It is also consistent
with the CRPD's call for states to provide access to the support that
persons with disabilities "may require in exercising their legal
capacity. '69 From a disability rights perspective, the supported decisionmaking model is consistent with the social model of disability that sees
disability as socially constructed and seeks to avoid the use of disabling
labels such as "incompetent." Adoption of supported decision-making
has been described as presenting "an opportunity to re-imagine the
disabled legal subject" 70 and may thus have political and symbolic value
in and of itself. From a public health perspective, supported decisionmaking has the potential to improve the overall physical and
psychological well-being of persons with cognitive and intellectual
disabilities by creating a sense of empowerment, which in turn has been
linked to positive health outcomes. In short, a move toward supported

66. Laura Bowey & Alex McGlaughlin, Adults with a Learning Disability Living
with Elderly Carers Talk about Planningfor the Future: Aspirations & Concerns, 35
BRIT. J. SOC. WORK 1377, 1386 (discussing the "need for adults with learning disabilities
to be given extensive support and accessible information in exploring options in order
that they can make informed choices about their future plans").
67. Id.
68. LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 106 (noting that many persons with ID
"are frequently not allowed to participate in decision making to the extent of their
abilities"); Ludlow, supra note 2, at 197 (discussing the experience of loss for persons
with developmental disabilities and suggesting that decision-making is a skill that can be
learned).
69. See CRPD, supra note 20.
70. See Carney, supra note 36, at 62.
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decision-making may have both symbolic and instrumental value from a
variety of perspectives."1
Despite its appeal, however, the call for supported decision-making
raises significant policy questions, as well as descriptive empirical ones.
First and foremost, it raises concerns about whether supported decisionmaking mechanisms can in fact achieve the lofty goals set out for them
and, if so, how. For example, how can supporters effectively empower
individuals with cognitive and intellectual disabilities to make decisions
on their own behalf? How can supported decision-making systems
ensure that they are truly voluntary and minimize the risk that they will
In
subject persons with disabilities to new forms of coercion?
advocating for a move toward supported decision-making as an
alternative to guardianship, Salzman has described supported decisionmaking models as having four primary characteristics: (1) the individual
retains legal decision-making authority; (2) the relationship is freely
entered into and can be terminated at will; (3) the individual actively
participates in decision-making; and (4) decisions made with support are
This is, however, a normative
generally legally enforceable.7 2
description, and the question is whether it is empirically supported.
Accordingly, Part III explores the evidence base for supported decisionmaking.
III. THE EVIDENCE BASE FOR SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING
Perhaps surprisingly for a model in its second decade of
development, there is little empirical evidence directly evaluating
supported decision-making. Indeed, a number of recent discussions of
supported decision-making note the lack of, and need for, empirical
evidence that evaluates the different models of supported decisionmaking.73 Even articles that provide extensive discussions of the benefits
71. Cf id. (suggesting that the move toward supported decision-making should be
"highly... commended on the basis of its symbolic significance" despite concerns that it
may be in reality "de facto" guardianship) (emphasis in original).
72. Salzman, Guardianshipfor Persons,supra note 35, at 306-07.
73. See, e.g., NIDUS, A STUDY OF PERSONAL PLANNING IN BRITISH COLUMBIA:
REPRESENTATION AGREEMENTS WITH STANDARD POWERS 4 (2010), available at
www.nidus.ca/PDFs/NidusResearchRA7 InAction.pdf ("There is a need for
qualitative research to gain insight into the motivations and experiences of adults and
their personal supporters with respect to the making and using of Representation
Agreements with standard powers."); OFFICE OF THE PUB. ADVOCATE, supra note 63, at 8
("Supported decision-making is presently quite loosely defined and articulated and there
is very little material in literature or policy to draw on."); Wendy Harrison,
Representation Agreements in British Columbia: Who is Using Them and Why? 2
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Simon Fraser University) (2008) ("To date, there has been no
research undertaken in British Columbia examining the use of representation
agreements."); Improving Supported Decision Making, VICTORIAN L. REFORM COMM'N
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and potential drawbacks of supported or co-decision-making provide
little or no empirical support for their claims.74 This dearth of empirical
literature is not unique to supported decision-making; there is also
surprisingly little evaluative empirical literature on guardianship.7 5
Nevertheless, this lack of evidence is unfortunate not only because it
means that we do not know whether supported decision-making is
achieving its goals but also because it makes it difficult to develop and
support effective evidence-based supported decision-making practices.
In this Part, we therefore identify some of the potential contexts in which
supported decision-making could and should be evaluated moving
forward, noting the existing research and incorporating additional
findings. The overarching questions are whether supported decisionmaking achieves its goals and whether it achieves such goals better than
existing practices such as guardianship models.
In discussing the existing and needed research on supported
decision-making, we find it helpful to distinguish between two key types
of research questions. First, there are questions related to the utilization
of supported decision-making (e.g., what are the demographic
characteristics of those involved, and how common are such
arrangements?). Second, there are questions about the outcomes of the
supported decision-making process. Outcomes, in turn, can be divided
into process-oriented outcomes on the one hand and substantive
outcomes on the other, a distinction that serves as a useful tool in
identifying existing research and in prompting further research.76

(June 1, 2011), http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/journal-articles/improving-supporteddecision-making (calling for submissions providing opinions and evidence as to benefits
of supported or co-decision making); Pathare & Shields, supra note 34, at 27, 30
(exploring research on supported decision-making-very broadly defined-for persons
with mental illness and concluding that the research on supported decision-making is
limited and that more research is "urgently needed").
74. See e.g., Devi et al., supra note 64; Sarah Burningham, Developments in
Canadian Adult Guardianshipand Co-Decision-Making Law, 18 DALHOUSIE J. LEGAL
STUD. 119 (2009).
75. See Linda S. Whitton & Lawrence A. Frolik, Surrogate Decision-Making
Standards for Guardians: Theory and Reality, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1491 (2012)
(describing the lack of empirical literature on how guardians make decisions on behalf of
wards); TEASTER ET AL., supra note 12, at 15 (noting that there is little empirical literature
on guardianship provisions); see also CTR. FOR ELDERS & THE COURTS, NAT'L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, ADULT GUARDIANSHIP COURT DATA AND ISSUES: RESULTS FROM AN

SURVEY 8 (2010), available at http://www.guardianship.org/reports/
GuardianshipSurveyReport.pdf ("Recent attempts at collecting state data on
guardianships have demonstrated the absence of meaningful data.").
76. See Nina A. Kohn & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Designating Health Care
Decisionmakersfor Patients Without Advance Directives: A Psychological Critique, 42
GA. L. REV. 979, 1008-10 (2008) (making the distinction and discussing tradeoffs
ONLINE
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Research on SupportedDecision-Making Utilization

Understanding how supported decision-making systems are being
utilized has the potential to help identify those populations that might
benefit from or desire decision-making support, and thus those
populations to whom resources and services related to supported
decision-making might be most profitably directed. Understanding the
gaps in knowledge about supported decision-making utilization can also
serve to target much-needed further empirical research. Accordingly, in
this Section we identify research, and, more importantly, gaps in
research, on the rate at which existing supported decision-making
systems are utilized, and the demographic composition of both the
individuals receiving decision-making support (i.e., "principals") and
those appointed to provide that support (i.e., "supporters").
1.

Frequency of Utilization

One fundamental question about supported decision-making is how
often individuals make use of supported decision-making arrangements
where they are currently available. Whether because of differences in
actual utilization, reporting, or the populations making use of such
arrangements, estimates of such rates vary substantially. For instance,
Surtees identified a small number of cases filed under Saskatchewan's
Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act (2001), about 500 in
approximately a seven-year period.77 He found that more than 90
percent of applications seeking some sort of support under the Act asked
for a guardian to be appointed to help with decisions regarding person or
property; only about seven percent (30/446) applied to have a codecision-maker appointed.78 By contrast, a review of Representation
Agreements in British Columbia conducted by Nidus Personal Planning
Resource Centre and Registry 79 identified far more Agreements over a
three-and-a-half-year period: almost 1,000 Agreements requesting a
representative to help with standard decisions.8 0
between process outcomes and substantive outcomes in the context of default surrogate
statutes).
77. Surtees, supra note 52, at 92. Surtees noted that the cases he reviewed did not
include 83 closed cases placed in storage that he was unable to access. Id.
78. Id. Surtees did not report further individuating information about the cases. Id
79. Nidus is a nonprofit organization that provides training and assistance to those
interested in forming such agreements. See supra note 38.
80. Id. (identifying 989 Representation Agreements with standard powers). Under
the relevant Act, "standard powers" can include personal care, routine management of
financial affairs, or certain health care decisions. Non-standard (or Section 9)
Agreements grant broader authority to the representative, especially in the health-care
context, and include the authority to override some decisions by the principal.
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Neither study, however, allows for a good estimate of the rate of
uptake among those subsets of the population for which they are touted
as advantageous. This is because neither study identified the population
out of which these counts were made, i.e., whether 500 or 1,000
represented a large proportion of those who might be eligible for
assistance under the relevant legislation. The Nidus study also did not
compare the rate of those choosing standard Agreements with the rate of
those selecting non-standard ones, perhaps because this number is not
clear either. One unpublished study (a master's thesis by Harrison)
identified approximately 600 individuals in British Columbia who had
entered in Section 9 (non-standard) Agreements as of mid-2007, with a
final sample of 93 individuals.8 1
Thus, it is difficult to determine to what extent persons with
cognitive and intellectual disabilities would utilize supported decisionmaking if made available in the United States. Moreover, even if we
were able to predict what proportion of those who would otherwise be
subject to guardianship would likely be diverted to a supported decisionmaking alternative, we would have difficulty predicting the number of
persons likely affected. One reason that it is hard to predict is that it is
unknown how many people in the United States are subject to
guardianship. Researchers have estimated that approximately 1.5 million
people in the United States are subject to guardianship at any given
time. 82 However, the actual numbers are unknown, in part because the
guardianship process is state-specific and many states fail to provide the
types of records that would enable a national assessment.83

81.

Harrison, supra note 73, at 22-25.

82. See BRENDA K. UEKERT & RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, ADULT GUARDIANSHIPS: A "BEST GUESS" NATIONAL ESTIMATE AND THE

MOMENTUM FOR REFORM 107, 108-09 (2011), available at http://www.guardianship.org/
reports/UekertVanDuizendAdult Guardianships.pdf (estimating that there are 1.5
million guardianships in the United States but suggesting that the actual number could
range from 1 to 3 million); Dorothy Squatrito Millar & Adelle Renzaglia, Factors
Affecting GuardianshipPracticesfor Young Adults with Disabilities, 68 EXCEPTIONAL
CHILDREN 465 (2002) (estimating 1.25 million adults under guardianship in the United
States); TEASTER ET AL., supra note 12 (discussing different estimates and the overall lack
of evidence on the frequency of guardianship); ERICA F. WOOD, AM. BAR Ass'N COMM'N
ON LAW & AGING FOR THE NAT'L CTR. ON ELDER ABUSE, STATE-LEVEL ADULT
GUARDIANSHIP DATA: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY 11 (2006) (discussing different estimates
and the overall lack of good numbers on the frequency of guardianship). That number
may have increased over the past 25 years. See TEASTER ET AL., supra note 12, at 4
(noting a 1988 Associated Press estimate putting the number at 400,000).
83. WOOD, supra note 82, at 33-34 (finding that nearly two-thirds of state court
administrative offices that responded to a national survey on guardianship did not keep
separate data on guardianship cases, and even those that did tended to limit the separate
data to that on frequency of filings and dispositions).
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Another reason that it is hard to predict the number of persons who
could be diverted from guardianship into supported decision-making is
that it is also unknown what portion of persons subject to guardianship
are persons with ID-the population most frequently discussed as having
the potential to benefit from supported decision-making.84 However, the
United States likely has a sizeable population of persons with ID subject
to guardianship. A 2005 survey of public guardianship programs found
that those programs providing researchers with adequate information
about their wards reported that more than half of such wards had a
primary diagnosis of either developmental disability or mental
retardation.85 The study reported that this finding represented a shift in
the guardianship system away from an older adult population to a
younger adult population.86 However, the study did not examine the
diagnoses of wards with private guardians, and it is certainly possible
that there are significant differences in the diagnoses of those in private
guardianship relationships.87
2.

Demographics of Principals

Another fundamental question about supported decision-making is
what groups of people tend to utilize such arrangements. Unfortunately,
there are also few data on the demographic composition of those who
enter into supported decision-making relationships as principals. Data
from British Columbia 88 suggest that women are more likely to be
principals than are men. Nidus's figures indicate that, when it comes to
Representation Agreements involving "standard" provisions, there was 89a
55 percent to 45 percent disparity between women and men.
Harrison's smaller study suggests, however, that the disparity is even
greater when non-standard provisions are involved; the breakdown was

84. See id. at 34 (stating that it is unknown what percentage of wards have "mental
retardation" or "developmental disabilities").
85. See TEASTER ET AL., supra note 12, at 66. Among them, the responding groups
had served over 24,000 wards. This figure is based on adding up the figures provided in
the "extent of guardianship tables" from Section IV of the report. See id. § IV.
86. See id. at 95.
87. It is also unknown what percentage of guardians are public guardians, as
opposed to family members, friends, or other third parties. See WOOD, supra note 82, at
34 (lamenting this lack of information). It can be reasonably assumed, however, that
most guardians are not public guardians. Cf id. at 12 (referring to a study of
guardianships in the San Francisco Probate Court that found 29% of guardians appointed
were public guardians).
88. Much of the data discussed herein comes from British Columbia-based studies.
This is simply due to a lack of empirical studies from other jurisdictions.
89. NiDus, supra note 73, at 2.
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approximately 2:1.90 In terms of age, some evidence suggests a bimodal
distribution of those who engage representatives, at least ones for
Agreements with "standard" provisions. In particular, adults in their 20s
were the largest age category of those making such selections (23
percent), with those in their 80s at just under 20 percent. 91 Together,
adults over 70 made up about 40 percent of those selecting
92
representatives, while those over 60 made up about 50 percent.
Harrison's study suggests, however, that those selecting Agreements
involving non-standard provisions tend to be older than those selecting
Agreements with standard provisions. 93 The Harrison study also found
that principals involved with non-standard Agreements tended to be
married, relatively well-off financially, and relatively educated.94
Nevertheless, because supported decision-making is often seen as
particularly likely to benefit those with ID, a fundamental concern with
these demographic data is that it is unclear how representative they are of
individuals with ID. As noted, for instance, Surtees did not distinguish
among the cases he reviewed, and it is not evident whether Harrison's
sample included persons with ID, 9 nor is it clear from the Nidus study
that a significant portion (or even any) of the 989 individuals had some
form of ID. Thus, if these samples are not representative, then it is
harder to draw inferences from the research. That is, on the one hand,
finding that individuals without ID make use of supported decisionmaking would only reinforce the idea that this approach could promote
inclusion of persons with ID by offering them the same supports that are
used by a broader population. On the other hand, that same finding
would give little insight into the important question of the extent to
which persons with ID make use of supported decision-making or how
supported decision-making can help persons with ID. Thus, further
research addressing these basic questions of who uses supported
decision-making, and when, is of substantial importance.

90. Harrison, supra note 73, at 30 (noting a 62.5% to 37.5% women-to-men split).
91. NIDUS, supra note 73, at 2.
92. Id. This may be consistent with findings that elderly persons seem to prefer
group decision-making by multiple family members. See Suzanne B. Yellen et al.,
Communication About Advance Directives: Are Patients Sharing Information With
Physicians?, 1 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICs 377 (1992).

93. Harrison, supra note 73, at 30.
94. Id. at 30-32.
95. Id. at 36 tbl.1 (setting forth diagnoses of principals and not listing either ID or
developmental disability; however, persons with ID may have been included in other
categories-e.g., the category of"Alzheimer's or other dementia").
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Demographics of Supporters

Just as it is important to understand who elects to receive support, in
order to understand how supported decision-making actually works, it is
critical to understand who tends to provide that support. Unfortunately,
there are also little data available as to those selected to be supporters.
We know that, in the context of surrogate decision-making for health
care, patients who execute advance directives (documents that allow
someone else to make health care decisions on their behalf in the event
that they lose capacity to make those decisions for themselves)
overwhelmingly select relatives as proxies or surrogates.96 Some
evidence suggests a similar trend for the selection of supporters in
supported decision-making arrangements. Specifically, close to 90
percent of Agreements in British Columbia appointed a parent, child,
sibling, spouse, or other family member as a representative. 9' Similar to
surrogate selection, immediate family took precedence: less than ten
percent of representatives were "other family members"-the same
percentage as "friends." 98 Similar results came from the small sample of
non-standard (Section 9) Agreements in British Columbia: over 80
percent of individuals selected a spouse (29 percent) or other family
member (54 percent) as the representative, with 17 percent appointing a
friend. 99
Non-relatives, however, appear to be frequently selected as
alternative representatives in the British Columbia system, at least for
standard Representation Agreements. In this context, the proportion of
non-immediate family members (others and friends) rises to about 40
percent. Interestingly, however, when monitors are selected-i.e.,
someone to oversee the representative-these proportions reverse.
Approximately 30 percent of monitors are "other family members" and
an equal percentage of monitors are "friends," perhaps suggesting the
desire to have a more objective level of "checks and balances." ' 00
The existing information suggests that supported decision-making is
likely to occur primarily within families and thus be subject to the
attendant family dynamics-dynamics which may or may not be
96. See Kohn & Blumenthal, supra note 76, at 990 & n.55.
97. NIDUS, supra note 73, at 3. Thus, the representative is probably likely to be the
same person who would be selected as a guardian if a guardianship had been pursued
instead. Where a guardianship is pursued over a person with ID, the petitioner is
typically the allegedly incapacitated person's parent and, in particular, his or her mother.
See Millar, supra note 13, at 379 (finding that petitions for guardianship over persons
with ID are typically filed by family members, usually mothers).
98. NIDUS, supra note 73, at 3.
99. Harrison, supra note 73, at 69.
100. NIDUS, supra note 73, at 3.
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empowering. However, more information on the identities of supporters
and their relationships to principals is critical if we are to understand how
supporters are selected and the relational context in which supported
decision-making is likely to occur.
4.

Impact of Race and Ethnicity

None of the empirical studies we identified as discussing supported
decision-making addressed any racial demographics. However, such
information would be valuable to those evaluating supported decisionmaking practices because race and ethnicity may affect whether people
engage in supported decision-making and who is selected as a supporter.
Specifically, racial and ethnic differences exist in patients' approaches to
medical decision-making, with members of some groups preferring a
more distributed, non-patient-centered approach.'0 1 Members of such
groups may be more willing than average to engage in supported
decision-making in situations in which the principal would otherwise be
expected to make decisions independently, but perhaps less likely than
average to see supported decision-making as a desirable alternative to
guardianship. Racial and socio-economic status differences also appear
in the likelihood of possessing advance directives generally, with white,
higher socio-economic status, and more educated individuals more likely
to execute advance directives. 10 2 Thus, some persons belonging to
certain racial groups and those with higher socio-economic status may
similarly be more likely to enter into supported decision-making
arrangements. However, from existing studies, we cannot ascertain
whether such differences exist.
B.

Research on SupportedDecision-MakingOutcomes

The most important questions related to supported decision-making
are those related to the ability of supported decision-making systems to
achieve their goals. In this Section, we therefore analyze the meager
existing research on the effect and impact of supported decision-making
systems and identify key gaps in that research. To do so, we divide the
research into two broad categories: (1) research that provides insight
into the process of supported decision-making (e.g., the types of
101. See, e.g., Leslie J. Blackhall et al., Ethnicity and Attitudes Toward Patient
Autonomy, 274 JAMA 820, 824 (1995).
102. See Rebecca S. Allen & John L. Shuster, Jr., The Role of Proxies in Treatment
Decisions: EvaluatingFunctional Capacity to Consent to End-of-Life Treatments Within
a Family Context, 20 BEHAV. Sc. & L. 235, 239 (2002); Sarah Forbes et al., End-of-Life
Decision-Making for Nursing Home Residents with Dementia, 32 J. NURSING
SCHOLARSHIP 251, 252 (2000).
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discussions that occur in supported decision-making relationships); and
(2) research that provides insight into the substantive outcomes of those
processes (e.g., the decisions that are reached).
1.

Process Outcomes

There is a growing literature addressing how supported decisionmaking should work;'0 3 there is far less literature on how it in fact does
work. 0 4 Harrison's unpublished thesis examining Representation
Agreement arrangements in British Columbia'o° is one of the more
thorough descriptive accounts. Harrison found that over 80 percent of
individuals she studied spoke with their representative at least several
times a week and that nearly half spoke daily. 10 6 Harrison also inquired
into some of the substance of these discussions, focusing on the health
care aspects of the discussions. Among other findings, Harrison
discovered that about half of the individuals studied had only general
discussions with their representatives, but others had discussed specific
issues such as life support, organ donation, pain control, or do-notresuscitate orders. 10 7 Harrison also found that most of her subjects had
discussed "their feelings and values about the types of situations that
could arise and what impact that should have on how their representative
made treatment decisions."' 1 8 When principals and supporters do discuss
values, there may be an increased likelihood that supporters will come to
understand, agree with, and share the principal's values, and thus be
more likely to effectuate the principal's preferences.' 0 9 Accordingly,
Harrison's findings-especially if corroborated by further supported

103. See generally, e.g., Salzman, Guardianshipfor Persons, supra note 35; Robert
M. Gordon, The Emergence of Assisted (Supported) Decision-Making in the Canadian
Law of Adult Guardianship and Substitute Decision-Making, 23 INT'L J. L. &
PSYCHIATRY 61 (2000).
104. Some research presents case studies of individuals selecting supported decisionmaking, e.g., Gordon, supra note 103, at 64-65; however, the actual decision-making
process is not described in any detail.
105. See Harrison, supra note 73.
106. Id. at 71 tbl.25.
107. Id. at 77 tbl.28.
108. Id. at 78.
109. Elsewhere, two of us have suggested that surrogate health care decision-makers
be selected based on degree of shared values in order to maximize the likelihood of
proxies making the treatment decision that matches what a patient would choose. See
Kohn & Blumenthal, supra note 76, at 1011-12 (suggesting this as an alternative to
selection based on familial proximity). But see Carol Matheis-Kraft & Karen A. Roberto,
Influences of a Values Discussion on Congruence Between Elderly Women and Their
Families on Critical Health Care Decisions, 9(4) J. WOMEN & AGING 5, 15 (1997)
(noting that prior discussion by competent patients and their proxies rarely led to
improved proxy accuracy, but noting methodological limitations in their study).

2013]

SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING

1137

decision-making research confirming that such discussion occurs
regularly-provide reason to be optimistic that supported decisionmaking will protect individuals' preferences.
Although there is a literature base, albeit limited, on the types of
discussions that occur in supported decision-making, we were unable to
identify any research on the internal dynamics of those discussions.
Even the Harrison study did not discuss the dynamics of particular
decisions. This absence presents a significant problem for evaluating the
impact and efficacy of supported decision-making.
One of the primary worries, even for those advocating supported
decision-making, is the potential for coercion or other inappropriate
influence by a representative or supporter. 110 Exploitation and abuse
certainly occur in guardianship context (although it is unclear how
frequently),' l and supported decision-making arrangements create new
opportunities for abuse. Indeed, when we turn to more informal
arrangements such as supported decision-making, which may occur in
private and with less accountability, the potential for financial or other
abuse likely increases. However, data do not seem available on the
incidence of such abuse in the supported decision-making context.
Undue influence can occur even if the supporter or representative
may not deliberately set out to take advantage of or influence the
principal decision-maker, leading him or her to a desired outcome.
Through particular issue-framing, inaccurate assessment of the
principal's preferences, or simple conversational style, a discussion may
easily be led one way or another to an outcome that does not accurately
reflect the principal's preferences. Both kinds of undue influence,
moreover, might be facilitated by third parties mistakenly assuming that
supporters have decisional power and thus erroneously
elevating
12
supporters' opinions or wishes above those of principal.1
In addition to undue influence resulting from deliberate coercion or
unconscious influence by the supporter, undue influence may also

110. See OFFICE OF THE PUB. ADVOCATE, supra note 63, at 25 ("Supported decisionmaking does open up the possibility of conflict, undue influence, abuse and
exploitation."); Salzman, Guardianshipfor Persons, supra note 35, at 309 (noting the
difficulty of assisting someone in making a decision "without inappropriately influencing
her final decision" and noting importance of protecting decision-maker from being
"harmed or exploited within, or as a result of, the support arrangement"); Gordon, supra
note 103, at 75 (noting potential for abuse or undue influence).
111. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-1046, CASES OF FINANCIAL
EXPLOITATION, NEGLECT, AND ABUSE OF SENIORS 5 (2010) (identifying "hundreds of

allegations" of abuse of seniors under guardianship as well as confirming cases); Naomi
Karp & Erica F. Wood, GuardianshipMonitoring: A National Survey of Court Practices,
37 STETSON L. REV. 143, 150 (2007).

112.

Cf Carney, supra note 36 (discussing this possibility).

1138

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117:4

originate in deliberate deference by the principal decision-maker. That
is, some research on surrogate health care decision-making suggests that
older adults tend to prefer trusting a surrogate decision-maker rather than
expressing a treatment preference themselves. 1 3 To the extent this
deference occurs in the supported decision-making context, a substantial
part of the model's goals would be subverted. Unfortunately, however,
the little evidence regarding the dynamics of the supported decisionmaking process does not allow investigation of whether and how this
might occur. Evidence is also needed regarding the incidence of undue
influence, coercion, or abuse in these arrangements, as well as regarding
what risk factors exist that might encourage such influence and what
structures might help to discourage it.
2.

Substantive Outcomes

In assessing supported decision-making, perhaps the most important
questions, and the most difficult, are: (1) how to ensure that a decision
arrived at through supported decision-making truly expresses and
effectuates the wishes or preferences of the person with intellectual or
cognitive disability; and (2) whether such decisions are more beneficial
to the person with a disability compared to decisions made using other
approaches (e.g., decisions made without support, by a guardian, or by
another form of surrogate decision-maker).
a.

Psychological Impacts on Principals

There is reason to suspect that the interactive, dynamic results of the
supported decision-making process may have beneficial psychological
consequences for the participants, especially persons with ID. For
instance, there is some evidence that the guardianship model can lead to
feelings of disempowerment and loss of control on the principal's part
because he or she is not involved in the relevant decision-making.11 4 A
more shared process where the supporters or representatives are
generally, if not explicitly, seen as assisting15 may ameliorate this
perception.11 6 Similarly, under the guardianship model, relegating an

113. Steven H. Miles et al., Advance End of Life Treatment Planning: A Research
Review, 156 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 1062, 1063 (1996).
114. See Teaster, supra note 25, at 348 (in a qualitative study interviewing 13 wards
of public guardians, finding such sentiments common); Salzman, Rethinking
Guardianship,supra note 23, at 163 (describing guardianship as creating "constructive
isolation").
115. E.g., Gordon, supra note 103, at 62-63.
116. See Nina A. Kohn, Elder Empowerment as a Strategyfor Curbing the Hidden
Abuses of Durable Powers of Attorney, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 44 (2006) (identifying
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individual to "ward" status, making clear that another party has been
appointed explicitly to make that individual's decisions, may stigmatize
the individual not only in his or her own eyes but also in the eyes of
others. The supported decision-making model might counter such
perceptions by highlighting that, even with some reduced capacity, an
individual with cognitive or intellectual disabilities is nevertheless
capable of engaging in, managing, or directing self-relevant decisions in
a number of contexts.
As with some of the previous discussion, however, this is primarily
speculation.
We have insufficient data in the specific supported
decision-making context to know whether such benefits are actually
realized in supported decision-making. Given the often negative and
harmful stereotypes about persons with cognitive and intellectual
disabilities, however, and that the desire to address such stereotypes is
one reason for the push toward supported decision-making, this too
seems a valuable avenue of research.
There is also reason to suspect that supported decision-making may
have a positive impact on the cognitive and emotional health of persons
with cognitive and intellectual disabilities. Again, Harrison found that
principals tended to speak with their representatives at least several times
per week (though the substance of those discussions is not evident). The
more that such discussions in fact reflected decision-making processes,
especially active decision-making by the principal, then the more
cognitively active the principal may have been and, as a result, the more
cognitively healthy. 1 7 Moreover, to the extent that the supported
decision-making relationship enhances the person's sense of
connectedness with others, this too may have psychological benefits. 18
Unfortunately, it is also possible that supported decision-making
could have a negative impact on principals' psychological well-being.
To the extent that such relations do facilitate undue influence or

psychological studies suggesting circumstances that can lead to a benefit in the
principal's sense of control when assisted in making decisions).
117. Cf Michael Valenzuela & Perminder Sachdev, Can Cognitive Exercise Prevent
the Onset of Dementia? Systematic Review of Randomized Clinical Trials with
Longitudinal Follow-Up, 17 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 179, 185-86 (2009) (noting
that "cognitive exercise may be an effective strategy for delaying the onset of cognitive
impairment in older adults").
118. See Sarah H. Ailey et al., Evaluating an Interpersonal Model of Depression
Among Adults with Down Syndrome, 20 RES. & THEORY FOR NURSING PRACTICE: AN
INT'L J. 229, 241-42 (2006) (reporting that loneliness and social isolation are common
among persons with Down syndrome and/or developmental disabilities and that these
may increase such individuals' risk for depression); BIGBY, supra note 3, at 116-19
(discussing the importance of social networks for the psychological well-being of persons
with ID).
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exploitation, as some fear, they may undermine individuals' senses of
control and well-being. Similar results might occur if entering into a
supported decision-making relationship is not voluntary but rather
something foisted on the person with a disability, as some have warned
may occur.' 19
b.

Congruency Between Wishes and Decisions

As the Office of the Public Advocate in Victoria, Australia, aptly
explained in its 2009 Discussion Paper on supported decision-making,
"[L]iterature on supported decision-making speaks of discerning the will
and preferences of the person and of assisting the person to make and
communicate preferences and choices. There is often the implication
that the if [sic] the person's will, preferences and wishes are expressed,
they are actually making the decision., 120 Yet, as the report went on to
explain:
A key issue in supported decision-making is how and whether a
person can be supported to make their own decisions by assisting
them with those elements of decision-making where they have
difficulty. How does the group decide whether the decision is a valid
decision? Can a person be assisted through information, emotional
support or in some other way to make their own decisions if they do
not have, for example, an appreciation of the significance of the
decision they are making or a reasonably consistent set of values? 121
In other words, there is a potentially unavoidable paradox in
acknowledging that a person has diminished decision-making capacity
but maintaining that he or she is nevertheless capable of meaningfully
contributing to decision-making discussions and that the decisions that
result from such discussions reflect his or her wishes. Similarly, how
does one avoid a similar paradox in maintaining that a person can make
that decision with assistance unless one is confident that person has a
"consistent set of values" to ground such a decision?
Determining whether supported decision-making helps persons
achieve their wishes is further complicated by the fact that there are
multiple ways of defining those wishes, and it may not be clear-even to
the person with the cognitive or intellectual disability-what those
wishes are. For example, people in general have significant difficulty
with "affective forecasting," that is, with predicting both their own and

119.
120.
121.

See Carney, supranote 36, at 62.
OFFICE OF THE PUB. ADVOCATE, supra note 63, at 23.
Id.
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others' future emotional states, reactions, and preferences. 122 Moreover,
a person may have preferences for certain procedures either in addition
to, or even in lieu of, preferences for certain outcomes of those
procedures. That is, individuals sometimes prefer that decisions be made
via some particular process; if decisions are in fact made via that process,
then the individuals are less concerned about the actual outcome. 123 In
such cases, there is the possibility that a supported decision-making
system will yield a process that is consistent with principals' wishes
without yielding a substantive outcome that is consistent with their
wishes. The crucial question then becomes whether the system should be
considered to be effectuating their wishes. Some might argue that
establishing that supported decision-making provides a satisfactory
process for these persons might be as, if not more, important than
addressing the success of the decisions that emerge. However, allowing
process to be the sole criterion for evaluating the success of such
decision-making could result in treating the process as a success even
when it results in decisions that the principal perceives to be (or that
objectively are) substantively harmful.
c.

Quality of Decisions Made

We found no research evaluating the quality of decisions reached
using supported decision-making. This lack of research may reflect the
fact that it is very difficult to evaluate decision quality. Evaluating a
particular decision (whether made through supported decision-making or

122. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective
Forecasting,80 IND. L.J. 155, 217-22 (2005) (noting implications of affective forecasting
research for euthanasia and advance directives). For instance, people do not consider the
possibility of inaccurate assessment of their own preferences or the likelihood that their
preferences may change based on future circumstances. As two of us have noted
elsewhere, such difficulties can call into question the accuracy or value of decisions that
are made by simply imagining what a future situation will be like. See Kohn &
Blumenthal, supra note 76, at 995. Studies that ask prospective decision-makers to
speculate about future preferences may mis-state their findings to the extent that those
difficulties are not considered. More important, actual decisions (supported or not) that
do not consider these possibilities may inaccurately predict preferences at some later
time.
123. This point again draws on research in advance directive and surrogate decisionmaking contexts. See Kohn & Blumenthal, supra note 76, at 1007-10; Dallas M. High,
Standardsfor Surrogate Decision-Making: What the Elderly Want, 17 J. LONG TERM
CARE ADMIN. 8, 11 (1989) (elders seemed more interested in whom to select as a
surrogate than in which standard the surrogate would use for making decisions about
them); Angela Fagerlin et al., The Use of Advance Directives in End-of-Life DecisionMaking: Problems and Possibilities, 46 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 268, 278 (2002) (some
decision-makers seem "less concerned with the specific treatment decisions that are made
than about having the decisions made by someone they trust").
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otherwise) involves establishing a criterion against which the decision
can be measured. Thus, both policy- and data-driven research will be
necessary in developing appropriate criteria by which to evaluate
decisions obtained through supported decision-making processes. The
most obvious standards include whether a decision increases an
individual's welfare in some way. For example, evaluators might ask
whether the decision maintains the individual's autonomy or capacity for
self-determination, allows him or her to pursue work, leads to profitable
management of his or her finances, or avoids detrimental health
outcomes.
In evaluating decision-making quality, it is important to recognize
that the goal of reaching decisions that are in the best interest of the
person with a disability may come into tension with other values that
supported decision-making processes seek to promote, such as
autonomy, self-determination, and dignity. 124 For example, allowing or
even encouraging a person with cognitive or intellectual disability to
"learn from mistakes" may undermine efforts to protect that person from
harmful outcomes. Ultimately, the decision as to how to balance such
tensions is one for legislative bodies or, if they decline to do so,
supporters. For example, legislation might permit a supporter not to
acquiesce in a decision that might negatively affect a principal's estate
(as in Saskatchewan) 125 or that is not "reasonable" (as in British
126
Columbia).

In order to determine how best to address such tensions when they
arise, it would be helpful to have empirical evidence on issues such as
the extent to which such individuals truly might learn from their
mistakes,1 27 the value they (or their supporters) may in fact attach to such
personhood factors, and the likelihood that supporters will feel
comfortable either allowing a decision that may be harmful, or
28
"interfering" to redirect such a decision.
Assessing the relative quality of decisions made using supported
decision-making, moreover, will require more than simply determining
whether it yields a beneficial or effective outcome. It will also require
124. "It is easy to say that a person has the right to make unwise decisions and that
there is dignity in risk.... It is less easy to determine whether the person understands the
risks or can foresee the consequences of their decision," and thus who should make the

decision.

OFFICE OF THE PUB. ADVOCATE,

supra note 63, at 23.

125. See supranote 54 and accompanying text.
126. Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C., c. 405, pt. 3.16 (1996) (Can.) (setting
forth the duties of the representative).
127. Cf Jeremy A. Blumenthal, EmotionalPaternalism,35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 7072 (2007) (suggesting the difficulty of learning from mistakes even for persons without
cognitive or intellectual disabilities).
128. See OFFICE OF THE PUB. ADVOCATE, supra note 63, at 23.
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comparing the quality of decisions made using supported decisionmaking to those made by guardians. There are a number of ways such
comparisons could be investigated. For instance, researchers could
identify some decisions involved in actual supported decision-making
interactions and then present the facts involved-facts regarding both the
decision to be made and the individual and her circumstances-to a
mock or actual guardian. That guardian would render a decision that
could then be compared to the outcome of the actual supported decisionmaking decision. Other paradigms might be developed, of course, but
the important point is that empirical research comparing supported
decision-making and guardian decision-making will be useful in
evaluating supported decision-making (as well as guardianship).
d.

Psychological Impact on, and of, Supporters

Research on how supported decision-making affects those charged
with providing support is also needed. Such research might follow a
number of related avenues. First, we might investigate the effect of
participation on these supporters. Providing care for others often takes a
substantial physical and psychological toll on the caregivers. One
plausible hypothesis is that any psychological benefits accruing from the
supported decision-making model might benefit the supporter as well as
the principal, perhaps because the actual participation might be less
onerous than "traditional" methods of support or perhaps because of the
actual dynamics of the supported decision-making interaction. Another
hypothesis, however, might be that continually participating in another
person's decision-making, without the "luxury" of one party or the other
simply making the decision, creates more stress on the supporter than
might otherwise occur or otherwise be expected. Similarly, we might
study the effect of the supported decision-making process on supporters'
psychological characteristics such as locus of control, perceived
empowerment, etc.
A second line of research might explore who is the most helpful at
assisting a person with a cognitive or intellectual disability to reach a
beneficial decision 19-e.g., family members (of varying degrees of
proximity), friends, health-care providers, or others. Such research
would build upon evidence that in the surrogate decision-making context,
different proxies are differentially
accurate at discerning and effectuating
130
a patient's preferences.
129. Again, of course, whether the decision is in fact "beneficial" will depend on
which criterion is used.
130. For instance, family members' decisions are somewhat more accurate than
physicians' decisions, but there is little evidence of differences among family members.
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Third, advocates of supported decision-making often note the
importance of training and of the development of safeguards, formal and
informal, in curbing deliberate or unintentional influence or abuse. 131 It
would therefore be helpful to determine whether some supporters are
more "trainable" than others and, if so, which ones. It would also be
valuable to examine what types of safeguards, and what training in those
safeguards, might be most effective in reducing inappropriate influence.
Ultimately, the goal of such research would be to develop "adequate and
appropriate safeguards" that neither become too burdensome' 32 nor fail
to balance an individual's "freedom of action" with protection against
"undue influence, abuse and exploitation. 1 33 As part of this research
into safeguards, we might also recognize that, since third-party monitors
may be an important type of safeguard, 134 such research would ideally
inquire into the conditions, if any, under which such monitors are
effective and who is best suited to serve as a monitor.
3.

Effect of Individual Differences and Context on Outcomes

In addition to the need for broad research on these supported
decision-making topics, more focused study would be valuable. The
impact and effectiveness of supported decision-making may vary by
population and context, and such variations could potentially yield
different specific policy recommendations.
a.

Individual Factors

One useful approach might examine whether and to what extent
supported decision-making outcomes vary by age and disability. As an
initial matter, which, if any, of the findings sketched above (or that might
result from further research) vary depending on the age of the person
with a disability or the type of disability? For example, when might
older persons with a certain disability act, feel, or decide differently from
younger persons with that disability? Do such decisions, feelings, or
actions differ by type of disability? Under what circumstances are older

See Kohn & Blumenthal, supra note 76, at 999. Commentators have called for additional
research in this context to determine whether non-family members are any better. Id. at
999-1000.
131. See, e.g., Salzman, Guardianshipfor Persons, supra note 35, at 310 (discussing
the need for "adequate training of support personnel, monitors, and those acting as
surrogate decision-makers").
132. Id.
133. OFFICE OF THE PUB. ADVOCATE, supra note 63, at 25.
134. See BACH & KERZNER, supra note 32, at 168 (recommending that monitors be
included in supported decision-making processes).
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individuals, or those with different kinds of disabilities, perceived or
treated differently, either by their supporters or representatives, by the
public, or by the mental health or judicial systems? If supported
decision-making leads to coercive discussion processes (whether
intentional or not), or even abuse, does the incidence of such occurrences
vary with the principal's age group or type of disability? Do any
psychological benefits that accrue from the supported decision-making
model accrue differently for older persons, or ones with different types
disabilities, and, if so, why?
Other personal characteristics should also be investigated. Socioeconomic status, race, and education level often factor into health-related
decision-making, especially in the proxy or surrogate contexts;' 35 such
characteristics thus warrant consideration as part of future research on
supported decision-making. Gender is also an important factor in a
number of health-care decision-making contexts, and preliminary
evidence suggests some small gender differences in supported decisionmaking-related areas as well. For instance, Harrison found slight
differences in the reasons that men and women enter into Representation
Agreements 136 and found that men and women may have different
understandings or expectations of what their representatives will do to
effectuate their preferences. 137 The Nidus study indicated that women
majority of the Agreements described (55 percent to men's
undertook a 38
45 percent).
A plethora of psychological personality traits might also be
associated with differences in supported decision-making outcomes.
One of the most relevant traits might be differences in perceptions of, or
locus of, control. Studies seem to show that a more internal sense of
control is associated with taking steps toward having an advance
directive or other similar initiatives, 139 which generates at least two
research hypotheses: first, that those with an internal sense of control
might be more likely to undertake a Representation Agreement or pursue
another form of supported decision-making (and, similar to the point
above, that those who choose not to engage in supported decision135. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
136. Harrison, supra note 73, at 64-65.
137. See id. at 95.
138. NIDUS, supra note 73, at 2.
139. See generally Harrison, supra note 73, at 11-12; J. LaPuma et a]., Advance
Directives on Admission: Clinical Implications and Analysis of the Patient SelfDetermination Act of 1990, 266 JAMA 402 (1991); K.L. Rodriguez & A.J. Young,
Elderly Veterans' Beliefs ConcerningLife-Sustaining Treatment and the Control of their
End-of-Life Health and Health Care, 18 J. AGrNG & HEALTH 686 (2006); C.B. Rosnick &
S.L. Reynolds, Thinking Ahead: FactorsAssociated with Executing Advance Directives,
15 J. AGING & HEALTH 409 (2003).
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making would have a lower sense of control); and second, that the shared
decision-making of the supported decision-making process might
increase a principal's sense of control. Indeed, Harrison found that those
who undertook Representation Agreements reported feeling a better
sense of control over their futures.1 4 ' Both would seem positive
outcomes, especially in light of findings that a higher sense of control
can be physically and psychologically beneficial. 141
b.

Contextual Factors

Finally, just as capacity is generally recognized as varying by
context and decision, 142 the circumstances under which supported
decision-making will be beneficial and effective likely also vary by
context and decision-type. It would be impractical to suggest research
into supported decision-making's effectiveness with regard to every
different decision in which a person with intellectual or cognitive
disability might be involved. As an initial matter, we might therefore
focus on those contexts in which those persons might most commonly
find themselves. Health-care and financial arrangements seem the most
obvious and are, unsurprisingly, the primary focus of legislative
responses to the decision-making challenges of persons with intellectual
and cognitive disabilities. Nevertheless, as noted at the beginning of this
article (and as recognized in some legislation), there is a wide variety of
everyday decision-making for which persons with cognitive and
intellectual disabilities might invite assistance, and supplemental
research on these would be valuable too.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH ON SHARED DECISION-MAKING

The preceding Part suggested a discouraging dearth of empirical
information as to how supported decision-making functions in practice
and as to its outcomes. Fortunately, studies of related practices have the
potential to provide some insight. In particular, research on shared
decision-making in the health-care context is useful-with some
140. Harrison, supra note 73, at 40.
141. See Kohn, supra note 116, at 44-45 (discussing such findings); Kohn &
Blumenthal, supra note 76, at 1010 ("Executing an advance directive and expressing
one's desires as part of that process may also help instantiate a sense of control over
one's life and treatment, which can be beneficial for an individual's mental and physical
health."). But see Kohn, supra note 116, at 44-45 (acknowledging studies showing
circumstances in which sense of control might not be beneficial).
142. See OFFICE OF THE PUB. ADVOCATE, supra note 63, at 19; see also Lawrence A.
Frolik & Mary

F.

Radford,

"Sufficient"

Capacity: The

Contrasting Capacity

Requirements for Different Documents, 2 NAELA J. 303 (2006) (discussing the level of
capacity required to execute different types of legal documents).
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important caveats-because this model shares some key attributes with
supported decision-making.
Shared decision-making has been described as an interactive
''process in which both the physician and patients participate in the
treatment decision-making process,' 143 involving deliberation to achieve
agreement on a treatment choice. 44 Although there has been little
consensus on an overarching definition of shared decision-making,1 45
there appears to be fairly widespread agreement as to its central features.
Shared decision-making involves both clinicians and patients sharing
information and-to some extent-values, in the hope of assisting
patients to make better decisions.1 46 Thus, shared decision-making is
seen as a way to promote patient self-determination, the primary value
that guides health care decision-making in the United States,147 while

143.

Cathy A. Charles et al., Shared Treatment Decision Making: What Does It Mean

To Physicians?, 21 J. CLINICAL

ONCOLOGY

932, 932 (2003) [hereinafter Charles et al.,

Shared Treatment]; Isabelle Scholl et al., Measurement of Shared Decision Making-A
Review of Instruments, 105 Z. EVID. FORTBILD. QUAL. GESUNDHEITWESEN (ZEFQ) 313
(2011).
144. Cathy Charles et al., Decision-Making in the Physician-PatientEncounter:
Revisiting the Shared Treatment Decision-Making Model, 49 Soc. SCI. & MED. 651, 656
(1999) [hereinafter Charles et al., Physician-PatientEncounter]; see also Charles et al.,
Shared Treatment, supra note 143, at 932 (discussing essential characteristics of shared
decision-making, including need to share not only information but also the process of
decision-making with patient). We recognize that, at times, the dyad may involve a
health care professional other than a physician. However, the physician is typically the
focus of this empirical literature and is typically the other authority regarding treatment
decisions.
145. N. Moumjid et al., Shared Decision Making in the Medical Encounter: Are We
All Talking About the Same Thing?, 27 MED. DECISION MAKING 539, 539 (2007) (noting
lack of common definitions of shared decision-making and inconsistent definitions within
articles). Charles et al. attribute the divergence in definitions or lack of conceptual clarity
to differences in patient and physician roles, how and when each should be involved, and
what should be shared. See Charles et al., Shared Treatment, supra note 143, at 932.
Noting the "murkiness" in such definitions, Makoul and Clayman developed an
integrative model building on existing conceptions of shared decision-making. See G.
Makoul & M.L. Clayman, An Integrative Model of Shared Decision Making in Medical
Encounters, 60 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 301 (2006). Their model identified
essential elements (e.g., eliciting patient preferences and values, sharing physician
knowledge and recommendations, making a decision) and ideal elements (e.g., presenting
evidence, reaching mutual agreement) of shared decision-making, and noted general
qualities (e.g., partnership, deliberation/negotiation). See id. at 305 tbl.3.
146. See Charles et al., Shared Treatment, supra note 143 (specifically defining
shared decision-making by its four critical characteristics: involving at least two parties
(physician and patient); both parties sharing information; both parties taking steps to
reach consensus around the preferred option; and reaching mutual agreement); Makoul &
Clayman, supra note 145.
147. See, e.g., Cathy Charles et al., Shared Decision-Making in the Medical
Encounter: What Does it Mean? (Or It Takes at Least Two to Tango), 44 Soc. Sc. &
MED. 681, 682 (1997). Consistent with this approach, decisions are seen as best madeultimately-by patients, with shared decision-making adding the concepts of partnership
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simultaneously promoting important clinical objectives,
such as patient48
centered care and evidence-based patient choice. 1
Thus, shared decision-making is roughly analogous to supported
decision-making in the sense that the former is a form of dyadic
supported decision-making in which the physician (clinician) is the
"supporter" of a patient making a health care related decision or
decisions. However, shared decision-making is distinct from more
general conceptions of the supported decision-making model in four key
ways.
First, in shared decision-making, the "supporter" is the clinician.
Accordingly, empirical research into shared decision-making focuses on
this dyadic (clinician-patient) relationship, for the most part excluding
contexts where more parties are involved. 14 9 In supported decisionmaking, by contrast, the supporter is typically a family member or friend
(or multiple such supporters). 150 Second, shared decision-making does
not involve a formally--or legally-appointed party to assist with
decision-making, while supported decision-making does involve such a
party. Third, shared decision-making focuses on medical or health-care
decisions, and, thus, empirical research on it emphasizes those types of
decisions. Supported decision-making, as discussed earlier, can be much
broader than "only" medical decisions. It can, and is generally intended
to, include financial, legal, daily, and other decisions. Fourth, much of
the existing shared decision-making research has been with populations
that are dissimilar to the populations that are typically described as
having particular potential to benefit from supported decision-making
(i.e., persons with cognitive and intellectual disabilities). Although
research on shared decision-making has been conducted with a variety of
and deliberation to achieve, arguably, greater connection to the goal of informed consent.
See, e.g., Simon N. Whitney et al., A Typology of Shared Decision Making, Informed
Consent, and Simple Consent, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 54 (2003).

148. Whitney et al., supra note 147, at 54; Eleanor Herriman & Jessica Cerretani,
Shared Decision Making-Benefits and Technologies, 2 MEDICAL INFORMATICS REV. 1
(2007).
149. See Charles et al., Physician-PatientEncounter, supra note 144, at 657, 685.
Some shared decision-making researchers have built on this point to emphasize
concerns-which are also present in supported decision-making-regarding the
possibility of undue influence and the importance of "checks and balances" to avoid
"coalitions" forming that might influence a principal's decision-making. See J. Gabe et
al., It Takes Three to Tango: A Frameworkfor Understanding Patient Partnershipin
PediatricClinics, 59 Soc. SCI. & MED. 1071 (2004).

150. Indeed, even in the shared decision-making context, such relationships may be
more complex than a simple physician-patient dyad for many patients, especially those
who are members of more vulnerable populations who may rely on family and natural
supports or those with complex cases where multiple clinicians are involved. See R.K.
Sharma et al., Family Understanding of Seriously-Ill Patient Preferences for Family
Involvement in Decision Making, 26 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 881 (2011).
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populations (children, racial and ethnic minorities, as well as mental
health patients) 15' and in a variety of medical contexts (palliative care,
breast cancer, and other clinical settings), 152 it has not emphasized
populations with cognitive or intellectual disabilities. Thus, research in
each of these areas may have implications for supported decision-making
models, but, at this point, perhaps only at a broad level. Although
research on shared decision-making can be analogized to supported
decision-making contexts, the analogy will be limited until further
research is done.
Despite these differences, research on shared decision-making
provides some helpful insight into supported decision-making practice
and policy. One important contribution is that it suggests conditions
under which supported decision-making might be considered appealing
to principals. Specifically, research on shared decision-making suggests
that the extent to which principals feel that support is valuable may vary
based on the principal's age and on the type of decision being made. For
instance, a recent study from the Netherlands examined the use of shared
decision-making in medical (e.g., surgery or vaccination) and nonmedical (e.g., occupational healthcare, lifestyle decisions, diet, workrelated decisions, etc.) contexts, as well as patient preferences about
shared decision-making in those contexts. 153 Older patients (often

151. See, e.g., Alexander G. Fiks et al., Shared Decision-Making in Pediatrics: A
National Perspective, 126 PEDIATRICS 306 (2010) (providing a descriptive account of
how often shared decision-making is used in pediatric contexts); Lainie Friedman Ross,
Health Care Decisionmaking by Children-Is it in Their Best Interest?, 27 HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 41 (1997) (cautioning against too much authority in patient (child) versus
parent in pediatric setting); Monica E. Peek et al., Are There Racial Differences in
Patients' Shared Decision-Making Preferences and Behaviors Among Patients with
Diabetes?, 31 MED. DECISION MAKING 422 (2011) (examining racial differences in
preferences and behaviors regarding shared decision-making); Lilisbeth Perestelo-Perez
et al., Patient Involvement and Shared Decision-Making in Mental Health Care, 6
CURRENT CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 83 (2011). A prominent U.S. mental health

advocacy organization, Mental Health America, has even created a website specifically to
promote shared decision-making. See You 're on the Team: How Shared Decisionmaking Works, MENTAL HEALTH AM., http://www.nmha.org/go/youreontheteam/
howitworks (last visited Mar. 20, 2013).
152. See, e.g., Lisa J.M. Caldon et al., Clinicians' Concerns about Decision Support
Interventionsfor Patients Facing Breast Cancer Surgery Options: Understanding the
Challenge of Implementing Shared Decision-Making, 14 HEALTH EXPECTATIONS 133

(2010) (discussing shared decision-making in the context of breast cancer treatment
decisions); Emmanuelle Blanger et al., Shared Decision-Making in Palliative Care: A
Systematic Mixed Studies Review Using Narrative Synthesis, 25 PALLIATIVE MED. 242

(2011) (providing a narrative synthesis of literature on shared decision-making in the
palliative care context).
153. Atie van den Brink-Muinen et al., Preferences and Experiences of Chronically
1ll and DisabledPatients Regarding Shared Decision-Making: Does the Type of Care to
be Decided Upon Matter?, 84 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 111 (2011).
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thought to favor more paternalistic decision-making) found shared
decision-making important and also were more likely to experience more
involvement in decision-making in practice than were younger
patients. 154 Further, researchers reported that patients' preferences varied
by context, with patients attaching greater importance to shared decisionmaking in occupational health-care contexts, less in medical care
contexts, and the least in lifestyle choices. 155 The authors suggested that
whether a patient wants to be involved in decision-making has been
treated in most other research as some kind of trait characteristic of
patients or at least determined by rather stable patient characteristics
such as education, locus of control or self-efficacy. Few authors have
suggested that patients' preferences and experiences may develop
over time as people are more exposed or familiar with involvement in
decision-making or va 7 from one situation or context to another for
an individual patient.
If a similar phenomenon occurs in supported decision-making modelswhich, given the parallels between shared and supported decisionmaking, seems plausible-preferences about supported decision-making
processes may also vary by the sort of decision to be made.
Alternatively, of course, the findings may simply reflect that the
decisions involved are somewhat different: medical decisions such as
treatment or medication choices, versus occupational health-care
decisions such as when and whether to return to work. 157 Such different
decisions may be made with different supporters, and, thus, the relevant
decision-making dynamics might be different.
Research on shared decision-making also suggests reason to
question the extent to which individuals being supported actually want to
be involved in decision-making. A systematic review of 69 "preferencematched" studies (i.e., studies that examined whether patient preferences
matched what actually occurred) made two important findings as to
shared decision-making.
First, a "sizeable" minority of patients
preferred a passive role (i.e., delegating decision-making to the
physician) in decision-making, rather than a sharing or active role in
decision-making. 5 8 Indeed, in a number of the studies reviewed, a
154. Id. at 115. The former finding about importance placed on shared decisionmaking was consistent with previous shared decision-making research, but the latter
finding was not. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 116 (footnotes omitted).
157. Id. at 112 (Box 1).
158. Donald J. Kiesler & Steven M. Auerbach, Optimal Matches of Patient
Preferences for Information, Decision-Making and Interpersonal Behavior: Evidence,
Models and Interventions,61 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 319, 330 (2006).
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majority of patients preferred a passive role.159 These findings highlight
how critical it is to explore what proportion of those who participate in
supported decision-making in fact want to be involved in the decisionmaking process (and to what extent). Second, although a number of
studies in the review showed that matching preferences to actual
experience led to positive outcomes (e.g., measured by patient
satisfaction, adjustment, or symptom reduction), due to methodological
limitations and "inconsistent" results, the authors were not comfortable
concluding that this was so in all cases. 160 A robust research program
exploring the outcomes of successful preference-matching in the
supported decision-making context will be of significant value.
A second key insight offered by the shared decision-making
research is that training matters, but not just for those providing decisionmaking assistance. The literature emphasizes that effective shared
decision-making may require education and training for both clinicians
and patients. Clinicians might be taught, for instance, how to recognize
when and how to use shared decision-making, how to collaborate
effectively with patients, and how to discuss lifestyle or other
"preference sensitive" decisions.' 6' Patients, too, might benefit from
training, for instance in how to determine and communicate their
preferences. 162 As noted earlier, 63 training and education of potential
supporters is of paramount concern in the supported decision-making
context, both to improve outcomes and to avoid manipulation or undue
influence. The shared decision-making literature shows that education of
the person being supported may be useful as well.
Finally, the shared decision-making literature suggests caution
about claims that supported decision-making will lead to improved
outcomes, whether psychological or otherwise. The literature has
investigated whether engaging in shared decision-making in fact leads to
better patient outcomes, such as increased satisfaction, treatment

159. See id. at 324 tbl.3.
160. See id. at 330.
161. See, e.g., K.E. Hauer et al., Assessment of Medical Students' Shared DecisionMaking in Standardized Patient Encounters, 26 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 367 (2010)
(calling for more education for clinicians regarding lifestyle discussions and collaboration
with patients); van den Brink-Muinen et al., supra note 153, at 116 (arguing that, rather
than searching for perfect "tool" for physicians to use to implement shared decisionmaking, greater physician awareness of its value is more critical).
162. See Angela Towle & William Godolphin, Framework for Teaching and
Learning Informed Decision Making, 319 BRITISH MED. J. 766 (1999);

Kiesler &

Auerbach, supra note 158, at 335 (suggesting that focus on the patient would bear more
fruit than seeking to alter clinician behaviors, and arguing for improving physician skills
in tailoring shared decision-making approaches based on patient preferences).
163.

See supra Part III.B.2.d.
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adherence, and actual health. Joosten et al.'s recent systematic review of
the approach's effectiveness (vis-A-vis these outcomes) found some
positive results where shared decision-making involved long-term
decisions and/or chronic diseases in treatment programs involving more
than one visit. 16 4 Results, however, were mixed. Of eleven randomized
control trials that fit the authors' inclusion criteria, nine focused on
physical health and two focused on mental health conditions. Five of
those eleven found no difference between the shared decision-making
intervention and control group on outcome measures (all of which were
in physical health and involved a single decision or one consultation);
one of the eleven showed only long-term effects; and five of the eleven
(including the two in mental health) showed improved outcomes. 1 65 The
most frequently studied outcome measure was patient satisfaction, yet
only one study found improvement in patient satisfaction, and it involved
shared decision-making in a mental health treatment program. 166 Of the
an additional outcome of patient knowledge,
three studies that included
1 67
two found an increase.
Of course, as highlighted above, supported decision-making
involves a broader range of decision-making contexts than mental health
and medical decision-making, and this review found no benefits for
physical health-care decisions. 168 Moreover, one significant drawback of
Joosten et al.'s review-as with a number of the other overviews of the
shared decision-making literature-is that the authors failed to include
discussion of the strength of the effects they discussed. For instance, the
review only reported that the studies reviewed "reported positive
effects," or "found no difference between intervention and control"
groups; nowhere did the review report or calculate effect sizes of those
studies' data, as would be useful (if not essential) to evaluate the state of
the literature in question. 69 Furthermore, other reviews of shared
decision-making are simply narrative, thus, again, missing the
opportunity to meaningfully quantify the overall effect or usefulness of
shared decision-making. 70 Therefore, for shared decision-making
literature reviews to be truly helpful for supported decision-making

164. E.A.G. Joosten et al., Systematic Review of the Effects of Shared DecisionMaking on Patient Satisfaction, Treatment Adherence and Health Status, 77
PSYCHOTHERAPY & PSYCHOSOMATICS 219 (2008).
165. Id. at 222-23.
166. Id. at 223.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See generally Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Meta-Analysis: A Primer for Legal
Scholars, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 201 (2007).
170. E.g., Bdlanger et al., supra note 152.
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research (or, to be candid, for shared decision-making research itself),
more detailed syntheses and meta-analyses, including7 summaries and
comparisons of effect sizes, will need to be conducted.1 1
In sum, the shared decision-making literature provides some useful
insights for supported decision-making researchers, although the analogy
between the two approaches is a broad one. First, the literature
reinforces the perspective that the context in which individuals face
decisions is important to consider, not just personal characteristics of the
person with a disability or of his or her supporters. Second, it is
consistent with literature on supported decision-making that discusses the
importance of educating the stakeholders involved about the most
effective means of reaching a beneficial outcome (and, most likely,
developing appropriate criteria for evaluating whether the outcome is
beneficial at all), as well as a means of avoiding undue influence.
Notably, the shared decision-making literature highlights that the
principal stakeholder, the person with ID or other cognitive disability,
might benefit from education and training as well, though the supported
decision-making conversation has not reached that point. Yet the
literature on shared decision-making also suggests that education alone
may not be sufficient to guide supporter behavior; it may also be
important to craft incentive structures that encourage particular
behavior.' 72 Finally, this literature suggests types of research questions
that we might wish to apply in the supported decision-making context.
For instance, those seeking to understand supported decision-making
should consider undertaking research similar to that which has been done
in the shared decision-making context:
among other things, (1)
evaluating the preferences of persons with cognitive and intellectual
disabilities in various contexts; (2) examining whether such preferences
are matched in the real experience of supported decision-making; and (3)

171. An additional advantage of conducting such meta-analyses is that doing so
addresses concerns such as the "heterogeneity of the samples, settings, and measurements
[that] might affect the generalization of the results." Joosten et al., supra note 164, at
224. That is, Joosten and colleagues were concerned that differences among the studies
being reviewed would vitiate the usefulness of a broad review. This is, however,
precisely the purpose for which meta-analysis is useful, especially when moderator
analyses are conducted-i.e., analyses that use differences across studies as evaluative
criteria in and of themselves. See Blumenthal, supranote 169.
172. See Angela Coulter et al., Implementing Shared Decision Making in the UK, 105
Z. EVID. FORTBILD. QUAL. GESUNDHEITWESEN (ZEFQ) 300, 301 (2011) ("[T]argets and
centralised guidelines, supported by financial incentives and managerial imperatives,
have had much greater impact on the way clinicians work than exhortations about
patient-centred care.") Thus, for supported decision-making to be effective, it may
require ensuring that decision-making supporters have not only the resources and skills
they need to provide effective support but also the incentives to do so.
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assessing whether such a match has any effect on the process or
substance outcomes of decision-making. 173
V.

NEXT STEPS

There is reason to be optimistic about the potential for supported
decision-making processes to enhance the well-being of persons with
cognitive and intellectual disabilities. Supported decision-making has
the potential to provide individuals with cognitive and intellectual
disabilities the help they may need to manage their affairs and make
decisions about their own lives and, by so doing, to improve their wellbeing and promote their dignity.
Moreover, there are real problems with the current guardianship
system, which making supported decision-making available might
ameliorate. Most importantly, consistent with the notion that all people
are entitled to live in the least restrictive manner practicable,
guardianship should be imposed only when alternative mechanisms for
meeting its objectives are not reasonably feasible. Thus, for example,
guardianship should not be considered a routine part of permanency
planning for persons with ID.
However, without viable alternative decision-making models such
as supported decision-making, guardianship will likely continue to be
treated as a routine response to the decision-making challenges facing
persons with intellectual and cognitive disabilities instead of a true last
resort. It is therefore important for policymakers to consider how
supported decision-making systems might be institutionalized in the
United States to better17 4serve the needs of persons with cognitive and
intellectual disabilities.
Accordingly, policymakers should explore how supported decisionmaking could reduce the use of guardianship as well as how supported
decision-making approaches could be integrated into guardianship
systems. As explained earlier in this article, policymakers can promote
supported decision-making either by creating opportunities and
mechanisms for formally recognizing an individual's decision-making
supporter or by creating opportunities and mechanisms for providing
individuals with such supporters. 175 Both approaches may be necessary
173. In another example of process versus substantive preferences, one study showed
that simply engaging in shared decision-making leads to better outcomes on some
measures than actually matching patient preference to experience. M. Gattellari et al.,
SharingDecisions in CancerCare, 52 Soc. SCI. & MED. 1865 (2001).
174. Cf. KERZNER, supra note 33, at 59 (noting that many of the supported decisionmaking processes available in Canada "are of no use to the many people who have no
supports in their lives").
175. See supra Part II.B.1.
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in order for supported decision-making to benefit both those with and
without pre-existing support networks.
Unfortunately, as this article has shown, the existing evidence base
on supported decision-making is simply insufficient to know whether
any given supported decision-making process can achieve its promise.
To be sure, the goals of those promoting supported decision-making are
generally laudable, and many of the problems that those seeking to move
to a supported decision-making approach have identified are significant.
However, little is known about how supported decision-making actually
works in the jurisdictions where it is implemented. While there are some
cursory data on demographics of individuals entering into supported
decision-making agreements, it is clearly insufficient to understand to
what extent the model will be considered attractive or workable across
divergent populations. More importantly, there are virtually no data on
how support is provided in supported decision-making relationships,
including whether principals perceive it to in fact be "supportive" or are
actually empowered by it. Nor are there data about the quality of the
decisions reached under supported decision-making frameworks.
Given this dearth of information, it is simply too early to conclude
that supported decision-making is an effective decision-making model,
much less that supported decision-models should be institutionalized by
state actors. It may well be that supported decision-making provides a
meaningful, empowering alternative to more restrictive decision-making
models such as guardianship. It may also be that supported decisionmaking is little more than a farce-a facade of support that, in fact, fails
to provide it.
It is similarly too early to know whether certain forms of supported
decision-making are more likely to achieve positive outcomes-either in
terms of substance or in terms of process-than other forms. Thus,
policymakers seeking to implement supported decision-making regimes
have little guidance when choosing among different supported decisionmaking models.
Accordingly, significant research is needed to guide policy in this
area if policymakers are to actually design and implement practices
which effectively empower persons with intellectual and cognitive
disabilities to engage to the fullest extent possible in decisions about
their own lives. Our review of the existing literature on supported
decision-making, combined with insight drawn from the related
literatures on surrogate decision-making and shared decision-making,
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suggests 17five
primary areas for future research on supported decision6
making:

1. How do persons with intellectual and cognitive disabilities and
decision-making supporters interact with one another? What
techniques do supporters use to attempt to support decisionmaking? How do persons with cognitive and intellectual
disabilities react to these techniques?
To what extent do
techniques and reactions vary based on the form of supported
decision-making, the context in which it takes place, or the age
or disability of the principal?
2. Is supported decision-making coercive and, if so, under what
circumstances? Specifically, to what extent do supporters
engage in behaviors that are designed to be, or have the effect of
being, controlling or otherwise coercive? To what extent do
such behaviors depend on the form of the supported decisionmaking relationship or the personal or demographic
characteristics of those involved in the relationship?
3. Do supporteddecision-makingprocesses result in decisions that
are substantively different than the decisions reached under
surrogate decision-makingmodels such as guardianship? If so,
what are the differences, when do they occur, and why? To what
extent do these differences advantage or disadvantage those
involved in the supported decision-making relationship?
4. Do differences in supported decision-making techniques
influence the decisions made and whether principals are
satisfied or empowered by the process? If so, do such
differences vary based on supporter and principal characteristics
such as age or type of disability?
5. Can process or substantive outcomes of supported decisionmaking be improved by training to supporters, principals, or
both? If so, what types of training are most effective and under
what conditions?

176. See also Kohn & Blumenthal, supra note 1 (providing a condensed overview of
the state of the evidence on supported decision-making, and making parallel research
recommendations).
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While investigating other questions would also be worthwhile, a
focus on these five questions will help ensure that research findings are
most useful in informing policy choices surrounding supported decisionmaking.
The answers to these questions would help indicate whether or not
supported decision-making can achieve some or all of the goals its
supporters envision, including whether it can ameliorate many of the
problems associated with surrogate decision-making processes such as
guardianship. Research into these questions could also indicate which
forms of supported decision-making are most likely to achieve a
particular goal or ameliorate a particular problem.
VI. CONCLUSION

Supported decision-making holds promise as an alternative to
surrogate decision-making. For example, it has the potential to be an
empowering alternative to the much-maligned process of guardianship,
as well as an empowering element of the guardian-ward relationship.
The question, however, is whether supported decision-making can fulfill
that promise. If it empowers persons with cognitive and intellectual
disabilities to make decisions for themselves as its proponents claim, it
would advance the interests and human rights of persons with
disabilities. However, without more evidence as to how supported
decision-making functions in practice, it is too early to rule out the
possibility that it may frequently have the opposite effect. For example,
there is reason to be concerned that supported decision-making may
allow largely unaccountable third parties to improperly influence the
decisions of persons with disabilities, thereby disempowering persons
with disabilities and undermining their rights.
In light of the growing chorus of calls for expanding supported
decision-making practices, including integration into the U.S. legal
system, it is imperative that substantial further research be conducted to
examine how supported decision-making actually operates. Specifically,
research is needed to determine the extent to which supported decisionmaking approaches achieve their goals, and the conditions under which
they are likely to do so. If supported decision-making policies are not
guided and informed by such research, there is a risk that supported
decision-making will not, in fact, be supportive of persons with cognitive
and intellectual disabilities.

